


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4 Variants of Election Results Outlined

92CH0545A Prague REPORTER in Czech 15 Apr 92
10 p 5-6

[Article by Martin Minika. "Will the Velvet Be Come by June?"]

[Text] While in the corridors of political parties negotiations on postelection coalitions are coming to a head, increasing numbers of our citizens still do not know whom they will vote for two months from now. As the latest public opinion poll shows, more than one-fourth of the citizens of the Czech Republic remain undecided. But if we assume that our citizens are intelligent enough not to make their decision solely on the basis of perfection would bites, we can assume even today that from their ranks will come those who will either not take part in the elections or will vote for one of the parties in the center of the political spectrum. But, whatever the results of their vote, there will obviously be no startlingly surprising outcome. Therefore even today, knowledgeable observers are expecting at most four possible variants of the future political developments in our state. However, with one exception none of them is especially new. On the contrary. The outlook for our political scene is practically catastrophic.

The Optimistic Variant

Although the concepts of politician and optimism are to a considerable degree mutually exclusive, there still exist many of the former who believe that reason will prevail in Czechoslovakia. Not on the part of the voters—there it is taken for granted—but on the part of the political parties where it is in ever shorter supply. The optimistic variant expects that four large political groupings will emerge, which will begin to form prior to the elections and whose numbers will be increased by other parties after the elections. According to these views, a strong rightist and leftist bloc will be formed both in the Czech lands and in Slovakia.

For example, Fedor Gal thinks that the ODU [Civic Democratic Union] (Public Against Violence [VPN]), which according to the latest public opinion poll does not even have enough votes to be entitled to a seat in the parliament, will form a strong coalition with Carnogard's Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], the Democratic Party, the Hungarian Civic Party, and the Slovak offshoot of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]. This coalition, in his opinion, could get as many as 40 percent (?) of the votes. Facing it will be, according to the "five post-November emigre," the Movement for Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], the Slovak National Party [SNS], and the Slovak Christian Christian Democratic Movement [SKDH] with an equal number of votes. The balance will be held by the Party of Democratic Left [SDĽ], which might be willing, in order to preserve a single state with the Czech Republic, to vote occasionally in favor of the rightist and professional government resulting from the elections.

Although Fedor Gal can be rightly suspected of coloring the reality a little bit, he is not the only one who does not consider HZDS victory in Slovakia to be a foregone conclusion. The cards could be considerably reshuffled particularly by the former East Slovak Krav, where the situation is entirely different than in the more Prague more visible Bratislava. It so happens that Komer has an obviously justified greater fear of the "Bratislava extremists" than of the "Prague centrists." All the more so because two foremost federal politicians, Lalla and Baksy, hail from eastern Slovakia. It is, after all, no accident that the moderate politics of the Party of Democratic Left toward the federation stems precisely from the attitude of eastern Slovakia.

Besides the paradoxical victory of the Slovak right, linked with the former communists in the SED, by the idea of the common state, the optimistic variant of the postelection development also contains a surprise. In Bohemia and Moravia, according to the Czech optimists, the right will succeed just before the elections in negotiating the formation of a strong bloc, which would join the ODS, other than with the Christian Democratic Party [KDS], Club of Nonaligned Activists [KAN], and the anticomunists, also with the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] and Czechoslovak People's Party [Christian Democratic Union [SL-KDH]]. That way the right could face up to the equally strong coalition of the Social Democrats, the Liberal Social Union, and some of the Moravian parties. There would again be an approximately 40-percent stalemate on both sides, whose dark horse for the right would be the Civic Movement with 10 percent of the votes, and for the left the surprisingly strong Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM].

In the view of the optimists, the right in Slovakia and the Czech lands would be capable of agreement, which would preserve the common state on the one hand, and on the other would enable the economic reform to proceed the same way as now. A strong position of the left would in turn make possible quality opposition to governmental programs. There is only one thing left to say. In order for an impartial observer to reach the same conclusion, his optimism would have to exceed all reasonable limits.

The Pessimistic Variant

Pessimists are considered to be realists in these parts. And the pessimistic variant of the postelection development is indeed based on reality. Not on ours, but on the Polish reality. The current Polish model, which so frightens the Czech right, is considered to be the logical outcome of the failed euphoria from the collapse of the totalitarian regime and a natural impact of economic difficulties, common to all the countries of the former communist bloc.

According to the pessimistic variant, ODS [SL-KDH] and KAN will form a government coalition in the Czech lands, and the other rightist parties will not pass through

the electoral system. The left will remain splintered, and neither shall we find ODS as the center of the new political scene. In Slovakia the government will be formed by the victorious HZDS, which will be willing to admit to power only SKDH and SNS. Neither ODS (VPs) nor any other rightist party will receive the necessary 5 percent of the votes in the elections so that the only opposition to the nationalistic parties, which are leftist anyway, will be the SDP. The Hungarian Civic Party will consider itself lucky if the nationalists will not remain in the parliament.

The same groupings as in the republics will have a strong majority in the appropriate part of the Chamber of Nations in the Federal Assembly. The goals of both groups, however, will be diametrically opposite, while the compromise will not be the state setup but the economic reform. Whereas the Czech right will hold to its basic principles, HZDS and SNS will not renounce their arguments which they last used during the negotiations in Maastricht. At that time both parties absolutely rejected the formulation of a uniform economy on the entire territory as well as the state setup acceptable to the Czech side.

According to the pessimistic assumptions, after the elections the situation will lead either to protracted parliamentary disputes and crises of the Polish type, which will make it impossible to elect a president, form a minority government or adopt key laws, or the state will break up immediately after the elections. The pessimists also have their assertions on the recent Maastricht affair, which will result in the effort of this politician to create a solid barrier between himself and the Czech Republic, making any agreement with the Czech political entities impossible. Moreover, in their view it is beyond question that a federation, whose individual components have a different political structure, cannot exist.

After Slovakia breaks away, whether constitutionally or unconstitutional, the situation in the Czech lands will stabilize and to the east of the White Carpathian Mountains a leftist dictatorship with democratic elements will come into being, similar to Russia or Ukraine. In fact, in that respect the pessimists, who mainly had from the Czech lands, talk like optimists. We shall get rid of the Slovaks and everything will be easier, they say.

Unfortunately, as we have learned from history, a single nation or ethnic group generally are not the only source of difficulties, and simple solutions generally do not achieve the goal. If the pessimistic variant comes to pass, the Czech Republic would have so many problems that it would become easy prey to its economically stronger neighbors. Provided, of course, that they would still be interested in it at all.

The Leftist Variant

According to the pessimistic pessimists, who stand in the right end of the political spectrum, and according to the optimistic optimists, who are on the other side, in the next elections the left will be victorious everywhere. In

Slovakia, HZDS will rule over all the other parties with the exception of SDP, where both parties will wisely form an unbreakable leftist government. In the Czech lands, ODS will be unable to come to an agreement with the other rightist parties, and with an elegant body check will be pushed to the rear of the coalition of the Social Democrats, Liberal Social Union, and the silent partner, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). Alexander Dubcek will become president, Václav Klaus the prime minister of the federal government. An informant it would be Klaus as president and Mecer at the head of the CSFR Government. Václav Havel will depart for Hradec to write inner memoirs. In this connection, the Social Democrats are being suspected by many that in a decisive situation they will not hesitate as they did not before the February push of 1990, that they will forget about old disputes and will be just willing to enter the continuation into the government.

The pessimistic situation will manifest itself in a mass emigration of the new entrepreneurial class abroad, and the resulting wave of exodus by the elite of the nation will undermine the country's economy even more thoroughly than Klaus's economic experiments. The IMF and the World Bank, faced with the changes of the direction of the reforms, will block our loans, and foreign capital will find more promising partners among the Hungarians, and it will, according to the right, a renouncing of the exodus, as, according to the left, happy social conditions, when the mark will lose its Czechoslovakian character, as he says, but again as a foreign exchange position. The first unambiguous advantage of the leftist variant is the assuring preservation of the communist state. The second support of agriculture, which with the help of Trnava party, will be pushed through from Bratislava by Francúzka, who will thus finally fulfill the dream of the refugee of political asylum, Captain Zia.

The Pragmatic Variant

We have recently published the pragmatic variant of postinfectious developments (REPORTER No. 10). Its basis for reasoning is the striking voluntarism in the style and method of the political work of the HZDS and ODS, as well as the extent of pragmatism in both party chairman.

As we wrote at that time, Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mecer were the only two politicians who performed perfectly what worries the voters in their countries the most. Whereas ODS understood that what the Czechs and Moravians long for most is to become equal with the West, HZDS understood the problem of many Slovaks—they would like to become the equal of the Czechs. For the Czechs to get in step with the West means to realize the economic reform. For the Slovaks, to get in step with Bohemia and Moravia leads toward strengthening their own statehood.

What we thought at that time has been rather understandably complicated by the revelation of the Defense and Security Committee of the Slovak National Council that the candidate for secret cooperation under the cover name "Doctor" was in reality Václav Měšar. With the passage of time, it is becoming more and more apparent that the real goal of the affair (regardless of the truth of the charge which I do not, in fact, doubt) was not to eliminate a serious adversary from the ranks of the opposition. Not even a very understanding politician could assume that after so many attacks on Měšar the publication of this fact could endanger the position of the HZDŠ. It is much more likely that the publication of information from the secret "T" file could serve to discredit Měšar even more in the eyes of the Czech and Moravian public. Now it would be very difficult for Václav Klaus to tell his own nation that he is forming a postelection government coalition with an agent of State Security (StB).

Nevertheless, let us allow for argument's sake that even this variant would be possible. After all, nothing else was proven against Václav Měšar other than that he was a candidate for cooperation with State Security, which could have happened even without his knowledge. In such a case the federation would be saved, a president—most likely Václav Havel—would be elected, there would even be a strong federal government which, assuming a somewhat looser union of the republics, could preserve international prestige as well as the economic reform. The weak point of this pragmatic variant is, of course, that it counts on an obviously far too great tolerant attitude of those involved.

None of the above-mentioned four variants of postelection developments, which today are freely circulating through the political and journalistic circles, is exactly the most felicitous one. With one exception—the optimistic one, which, however, is a little too far-fetched. The question is, what do we actually want. Three years ago at this time, a communist dictatorship, 40 years in the building, held sway in our country; its methods and practices can be compared to France's fascist heyday only with difficulty. But unfortunately we are not Spain, and we must drink all of the bitter cup into which the few drops already fell in the autumn of 1988 and which was filled to the brim in February 1990 years later. To think that the transition from a totalitarian system to a developed democracy, whose economic progress is not harmed even by political instability of the interim stage, will be a walk through a rose garden would be unrealistic.

Nevertheless, two things about the new elections are already clear without question. First, before the elections both the left and the right will endeavor to again present the elections as a kind of referendum. As the new elections were a referendum by the citizens either for or against communism, the coming elections will obviously evoke the correct perception that at issue is rather support for the economic reform or its rejection,

including everything, opportunities provided by the economy, a thriving private sector and a business network with the possibility of becoming a millionaire, but also unemployment and collapse of entire industrial branches which cannot keep up with the Western market system. Unfortunately, the problem of preserving the constitution state, where it was given to us to live for 70 years, will be pushed to the background, especially in the Czech lands.

The second aspect of the upcoming elections is even clearer. The selves-resolutions, which gained for us so much obviously undeserved admiration around the world, will be gone. Apart from the dirt that individual parties will obviously heap on each other before the elections, the political scene after 5 June will be as messy as ever, more intense and harder. Whereas today, sitting below the belt happens only occasionally, after the elections it will be happening as a matter of course. A blow below the belt of course speaks mainly about the one who delivers it. And democracy depends on citizens carefully observing who it is.

Article Reviews Arms Deals With Libya

1. *Nová Vlna*; Prague. *REPORTER* in Czech No. 14 (12 May 92) pp. 12-13.

(Article by Ota Ševčík: "Deals With Libya.")

[Text] At the end of May a group of 11 Czechoslovaks who have worked exactly one year for the attainment of Qaddafi's on acquiring military training aircraft should return from Libya. In facilities at Tamanshah, deep in the desert 850 kilometers from Tripoli, they repaired instruments, hydraulic systems, and fuselages of L-39 Albatross airplanes.

A group of 11 Czech and Slovak experts returned from the same place at the end of April. According to official CSFR sources, they arrived here in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution that, as of 11 April, prohibits UN member countries from delivering military technology and spare parts to armament Libya, provide expert military assistance or conduct regular flights there. Actually, they have returned to Czechoslovakia because their official contract with the (NAR) and X Trade companies expired, companies that contracted experts for the previously classified project APB (a training program for Libyan specialists and aircraft technology repairs).

Assessment for al-Qaddafi

LANE's states in its 1991 edition that Czechoslovakia has exported 2,728 L-39 Albatross training jets worth 147. Some 2,094 of them ended up in the former Soviet Union, followed by Libya, which received 141 jets.

Other countries, today officially described as countries supporting terrorism, were not ignored. Some took 99 jets, Iraq 81 and Cuba 20. Apart from the so-called socialist bloc countries, deliveries were also made to

Alphonse, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Libya, however, topped the list in every respect.

The al-Qadhafi regime has been hungry for weapons since its establishment in a 1969 military coup. Until the energy crisis at the beginning of the 1970's made it possible to use the vast crude oil resources to pay for excessive purchases. At that time, when Colonel al-Qadhafi strengthened his dictatorship and declared the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, there was a large influx of military technology into the country, mostly from the friendly socialist countries.

Apart from Scorpions and M-1600 submachine guns, Czechoslovakia supplied al-Qadhafi with the infamously expensive Semtex ammunition, radars, and radio listening instruments. Armored personnel carriers (BVP) from Dubnica nad Vahom—about which we will speak later—and the Libyan trainers from Aero Vodochovy, said the best. Muammar al-Qadhafi decided to build his own large air force. Apart from French military mercenaries, he also bought an unbelievable quantity of Soviet MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-25 planes. Reportedly, their number greatly exceeds the air force arsenal of, for example, our country, and the number of Libyans is five times smaller, not even 3.5 million people. The dream of the dictator-colonel was to train first-class pilots.

Originally, Libyans were supposed to be trained as combat pilots by Italian experts. Apart from the fact that the Italians were not satisfied with what was offered to them, the main obstacle to the Romance-language training were the Libyans themselves. All the experts confirm the general opinion of Arabs as being. The would-be Libyan pilots were selected according to quite idiosyncratic criteria. They reportedly did not meet even basic criteria.

After the departure of the disenchanted Italians, pilots from the former Soviet Union arrived. They were equally unable to overcome the aversion of the chosen Libyans to flying.

Czech and Slovak experts from the Military Air Force Academy in Zvolen then took over. Their results were not fantastic, either, but their apprentices finally did learn to fly. A military pilot must go through a minimum of three stages of training before he can operate combat-level technology. In the first stage, he learns to fly propeller-driven planes, acquiring basic skills. Later he transfers to training jets, where he learns some combat techniques. Finally, fully equipped combat mercenaries are used.

Czechoslovak pilots trained their Arab pupils on the Albatros L-39. They are exceptionally agile craft compared with the international standard for this class of aircraft. They can be armed with two bombs or unguided missile launchers. According to expert testimony, they really are training devices only. It cannot be denied, however, that under certain circumstances they can be used against ill-equipped enemies such as Chad, which

Libya occupied several times. Aero Vodochovy also manufactures the L-39 ZA airplane, equipped with a twin-barrel gun. We did not deliver this one to anyone, however. It was developed for the protection of Czechoslovak borders and defense against slow and low-flying targets, if combat aircraft are needed. Muammar al-Qadhafi can use much more dangerous mercenaries from his vast arsenal.

We delivered 10 Albatros jets to Libya in 1978. A year later 37 more followed, then 21 in 1981, 64 in 1982, and finally 43 in 1983. According to eyewitnesses who worked in Libya, these planes were not used much. Most of them were parked at desert military bases and burned in sand. As in the case of the combat planes, Colonel al-Qadhafi went far in his magnanimity beyond his real needs.

The APBO Project

Aircraft deliveries very often result in additional commercial projects. In 1983 we began to build a complex of repair facilities in Tamahut. Yugoslavs delivering their Orca planes to al-Qadhafi also began to build in the area. The repair facilities were finished and equipped with state-of-the-art technology in the mid-1980's. In 1983 a contract was signed for the APBO project, that is, a contract which concerns training Libyan workers and repairs of some airplane parts.

If our information from those who worked in this plant is correct, for four years we were unable to produce a single Libyan expert. Libyans, pampered by al-Qadhafi, provided by the dictator's regime, simply have a weak work ethic. A paying customer is, however, the boss, even if his payments are irregular. This is why the project continued successfully despite our experts having to perform the repairs themselves.

According to them, some of the planes deployed at the military base in Brega landed at the repair plant from time to time. Despite most of the planes not having flown the appropriate number of hours, they were in awful condition. Desert storms and insensitive handling by the pilots had their effect on planes parked in the open air. As the way according to the testimony of participants, the pilots flew so seldom that they were putting their own lives at risk. In order for a pilot to maintain his skills, he must fly once a week at least. Libyan pilots reportedly got into the cockpits of their Albatroses once every two or three months.

Our experts took the planes apart, cleaned the sand out of them, and repaired them. Some 20 planes were overhauled annually.

We are to receive about 1 billion korunas (Kcs) for the entire contract, with the dollar equivalent to be deposited in a London bank. The condition was, however, that the work would be completed within the stated deadline. This has become a bit complicated because of the UN Security Council resolutions. Apart from stopping arms technology deliveries—none were planned until the

UN deadline on 15 April anyway—the federal government renegotiated the APRIO project. Despite the fact that it is arguable whether training planes fall into the category specified in the Security Council's embargo, it was decided that the experts will be withdrawn. The problem is, that this decision was made while it was clear that they must leave anyway since their contract has expired.

A Strange Deal

According to the testimony of one expert, the first group was to leave Libya on 6 April and a second one by the end of May. Applications for exit visas were submitted in February on behalf of both groups. Nevertheless, a memorandum of the CSFR ambassador to Libya was read to them, stating that the experts do not want to return. [sentence as published] Some time later, the Omskol director in Prague said the same thing.

Of course, this is nonsense. For a Czechoslovak, it is impossible to return from Libya on his own. The experts say, for example, that just between Tamanih and Ingoli there are 13 military checkpoints. Boys, slightly above school age but armed with Kalashnikovs, 6-4" submachine guns, are willing to shoot immediately at anyone who does not have documents of legitimate documents. It is impossible for an individual to obtain permission. To succeed in the jungle of Libyan bureaucracy, the application must be submitted by an official entity.

Finances are the other side of the coin. Travel expenses for our workers there amount to \$35 a day. The value of the dollar is weakened considerably by the disastrous exchange rate and fixed in unbelievably overpriced. After returning home, the money earned is enough to buy a better car or make a down payment on a house. Paying their own transportation back home would empty their pockets. Undoubtedly, the experts must wait for air travel to be provided officially.

At 1200 on 13 April, the project manager told them that they would be able to leave for Ingoli and catch the last flight to Czechoslovakia. After an overnight trip, having passed through all the checkpoints, they found out that no plane was about to land. Some 18 experts returned 33 days later via Tunisia.

The remaining 23 experts, who are employed with the X-Trade company, are still waiting in Tamanih for exit visas and appropriate transportation out of the country.

Apart from them, there are some 600 Czechoslovak citizens working in Libya in various places. They include civil engineering experts who work as advisors on coalition projects, and doctors and other medical personnel who are in Libya on private contracts. They are unlikely to leave the country even if the UN Security Council makes the embargo stricter, as it did, for example, against the terrorist regime in Iraq.

Most medical personnel have not been paid for months. According to eyewitnesses, Bulgarian doctors, for example, did not receive their pay for six months. They stay only because they dream that the money owed will be eventually paid. Most of them also believe that the embargo is the last step, which will lead to the collapse of Gaddafi's dictatorial system. Businessmen hope the same.

Business Is Business

Czechoslovakia, as well as other countries of the so-called East Bloc, has problems with sales. Countries such as Libya, where we have no commercial and personal relations and where we know the territory are good states to us. Despite their unwillingness to pay their bills, they represent a more interesting market than no market at all. Apart from capital goods, such as sugar factories or cement factories, we can also sell our consumer products there. And our weapons.

According to Blazek, after November 1989, we were supposed to officially put an end to arms exports. This idea proved to be unrealistic. It is not just the Slovak nationalists who insist on continuing our long tradition of arms production. A week ago, the "Father of economic reform" Vaclav Klaus described weapons as a regular commodity. CSFR Economic Minister Vladimír Dlouhý said a similar thing recently. Both were aware that, as long as Germany, France, Great Britain, the United States, and other developed countries export arms, there is no reason why we should not follow their example.

The problem is that our lower quality weapons can sometimes find markets only in regions where without previous. Apart from the new L42s submachine guns delivered to Burma, we can offer items even more attractive than updated versions of the L79 submachine and the famous T71 tanks from Martin Blazek's Machine Tools Enterprises. Apart from the Tamanih radio location system, we can also offer armored personal vehicles. In Dubnica nad Vahom, they have been producing them for years and they conform to the international standard. According to available information, this flying, armored and tracked vehicle is capable of transporting 13 men and is configurable in many respects, with the L3 Bradley armored vehicle or the German Marder. Its armament is impressive: it has 12 unguided projectiles which can be fired from a cannon, four armament guided missiles, an embedded machine gun, and it can transport other weapons for the passengers.

We have exported a number of them. So far, our national staff was unable to count how many. Nevertheless, many experts are able to recall relevant shots from the Iran-Iraq war in which these vehicles were used on both sides. Additional deliveries went to Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, and, of course, Libya.

Recent deliveries of spare parts were expedited on the basis of a license granted in mid-March. According to our information, our government and private firms are interested in continuing this business if the embargo is lifted. Well, business is business. Morality seems to be a naive stupidity from its point of view.

Foreign Inmates of Detention Camp Voice Woes

920805 144 Budapest 164 OR, 1 in Hungarian
11 Apr 92 pp 6 *

[Interview with camp commander Imre Kauber and unidentified camp inmates and guards at Kerepesi-utca by Series, date not given. "Camp Situation at Kerepesi-utca—There: Beyond the Bars."—first paragraph is 164 ORA introduction.]

[Text]

Imported Typhoid Fever

The police apprehended 30,000 illegal immigrants in 1991. Those staying in Hungary illegally or without an established job being held in the Kerepesi-utca camp under their supervision. Everyone is dissatisfied because of the conditions there. Our correspondent Laszlo Series talked with "guards" and guards and, following a recent break-out attempt, with camp commander Imre Kauber.

[Series] Did you come from Bangladesh?

[Inmate No. 1] Yes, I am a student leader from Bangladesh. There are many problems in my country, but there are serious problems in this camp as well. Sometimes there is no electricity during the night, no medical care, the toilet is often out of order, there is no hot water, one cannot move around. Once they took me for some reason to the punishment room. I spent five hours there in the cold.

[Series] Were you also beaten by the police?

[Inmate No. 1] I was occasionally beaten, and they also used tear gas.

Life in a Dugout

[Series] Are you able to communicate or to use the telephone?

[Inmate No. 1] No, no, the telephone is not working. We cannot go anywhere, not even to the post office. And they do not give us enough to eat. I am very hungry, I am here.

[Series] You came from South Africa. How long have you been here?

[Inmate No. 2] Eight months. When they brought me in, I sent a message to the UN Refugee Commission, but I was told that they cannot help me because I am being detained in this camp. They can help me one detained in this camp. The guards wake us up every morning at 05:30 only to count us. Every day. No matter what we say, they do not speak English. If they would send me back to South Africa, my life would be in danger.

[Series] Why, what have you done?

[Inmate No. 2] I was a member of the Inkatha movement and the African National Congress.

[Series] So you fought against the government?

[Inmate No. 1] Yes. The worst thing here is that everyone is always hungry. The food amounts to hardly more than bread and water.

[Series] Are there any Magyars among you? Hungarians who are in here?

[Inmate No. 1] We cannot even go to work because our union work is better because of the pressure there without someone without a job, and we thought that we would be able to find some kind of work here, another better place, another.

[Series] Did you come through the green zone?

[Inmate No. 1] No, we have no valid passports. We were detained for four days, and a job was found in a nearby village, but for me to leave the country.

[Series] And who?

[Inmate No. 1] Only because we do not have any money, and we did not think that if we could even work for two days to and go further. We were caught in here under these conditions. They were not interested, no one was interested.

[Series] So the main reason is that you do not have enough money or you. Do you have any valid documents?

[Inmate No. 1] Yes, only that a valid passport, every thing, and.

[Series] And what did they say, what will happen to you? Will you be expelled or?

[Inmate No. 1] We know absolutely nothing about anything. Now they have moved the bus from behind the bars. We had been behind bars until now, together with everyone together with some and what. What will happen to us now? We do not know, we know absolutely nothing. Nothing.

[Series] Have you spoken with an attorney?

[Inmate No. 1] We did not speak, no, no, it is not allowed. It is impossible for us to be here under these conditions. This is like a dugout, do you understand? Do the police not think of how many different kinds of diseases we can contract here?

[Series] You are in here, how do you perceive what is going on here?

[Inmate No. 1] It is not pleasant for them, but it is not too pleasant for us either.

[Series] Do you understand their colleagues?

[Inmate No. 1] Basically, yes. Interpreters come here once a week.

[Series] Water with sugar was flowing through the streets here, is that what the general situation is like?

[Inmate No. 1] It is not always like that.

[Series] And now are you pumping it, or what are you doing about it?

[Guard No. 3] They are pumping the water with a compressor into the bath, that is the only way they can wash it off.

[Series] How can these things happen? Do they purposely plug it with towels?

[Guard No. 3] I do not know.

[Guard No. 1] The truth is that, let us say, these people do not like to work.

[Series] What work can one do here?

[Guard No. 1] Cleaning.

[Intimate No. 4] Mine small girl sick (as published).

[Series] Where are you from? From Romania?

[Intimate No. 4] No. Polish. No doctor. No doctor.

Bath Every 10 Days

[Series] Commander, do you agree that these people are being detained here behind bars and under rather inhumane conditions?

[Klaiber] No one is being detained on these premises, i.e., at the temporary lodging of Kerepestancsa.

[Series] I beg your pardon, there are people behind thick bars who said that they are not allowed to take a walk or go anywhere.

[Klaiber] It is the interest of the Republic of Hungary and, in many cases, the interest of the guests here that they be dealt with and be expelled from Hungary as soon as possible without any severe means of force being employed.

[Series] Part of the room with bars is separated by more bars. Why are these people there?

[Klaiber] I see it as an assurance for at least reaching the point where we can clarify the identity of those who are brought here. After we have identified them, they can go outside.

[Series] When was the last time you personally went behind the bars?

[Klaiber] Well, today, yesterday, the day before yesterday, almost every day.

[Series] And what do you feel when you go there?

[Klaiber] As a human being, I feel sorry. Not because of what happens to them here. I do not feel sorry about that. We can jointly do something about that. As commander, in many instances I feel a little contrary toward the guests, toward those who do not want to stay where they are now but, most of all, do not want to go home although they have been told that they must go home.

Emotionally, I understand that they are ready to do anything. They break, demolish, destroy, and take apart everything...

[Series] The way I see it, these people are rebelling precisely against being detained under these conditions. We have seen water with feces flowing between the floors, the garbage has not been collected for months, it seems...

[Klaiber] There is a trash can on every floor for people to use. And there is also a garbage can that should be emptied by the guests. Two janitors work here whom I hired in February so that we could keep some order here, otherwise these people would be entirely covered with filth. I have had the house rules translated into 11 languages, and they are posted. What can I do if they do not abide by them or use them to wipe their you-know-what instead of using toilet paper. People from the water works come here twice a week to flush all the plumbing.

[Series] The refugees also said that the medical care is inadequate. A young man told me that his daughter is ill but no physician comes here.

[Klaiber] There is a paid physician on the premises. The guests can see him on request during office hours, once a week. If you do not believe that, go and see the infirmary. Disinfectant cleaning takes place on Wednesdays, personally verified and signed by the physician.

[Series] Does the physician regularly visit those detained behind the bars, if only to check any danger of infection?

[Klaiber] Well, the danger always exists. Typhoid fever, scabs, and everything you can imagine was brought in here. I do not want to list them all now. We had these people treated. We fully observe the Kojal (Public Health and Contagious Disease Station) and health regulations. Bathing must be allowed every 10 days.

[Series] Does that happen in practice?

[Klaiber] Hell, no. There is the hot water, that is, whenever there is hot water, whenever they do not destroy the plumbing, there is hot water every day.

Disciplined Guards

[Series] One of the greatest grievances is that they do not get enough to eat. We have seen it ourselves that what they are given to eat would not be given in any camp.

[Klaiber] I do not know what else to do. Let us see, today is Thursday. They get 10,954 kilocalories of calories. Tea, butter, and honey for breakfast. Egg barley soup and pork stew with sauerkraut for lunch. See, it is possible when everyone, including you and myself, gets only one dish for lunch, that it is strange that it is cabbage soup, it is possible, I do not know.

[Series] Are they not allowed to go, say, to take a walk here in the courtyard? For these premises are well guarded, there is barbed wire, and there are guards.

[Kisbér] They will now be allowed to go outside.

[Series] They were not allowed until now?

[Kisbér] So, they have been allowed whenever the combination and mood of the guards did not have us expecting a breakout.

[Series] Recently 30 people escaped from here. What has changed since then? You are still in place. Were the guards relieved, for instance?

[Kisbér] Those who were responsible have been disciplined according to the so-called service code. No one has been relieved. I will create the necessary conditions so that this will not happen again because of something for which I could be held personally responsible. As a result, you will find more bars within the building than previously.

[Series] Have the conditions become stricter for those inside?

[Kisbér] Well, I allow free movement only within a specified area, in plain language, within the building. For the time being, this is the best I can do, no matter how much I try. We do not know, sir, we do not know. All that we possibly can do is at least to maintain the present conditions so that they do not deteriorate.

Hungarian Military Industry Called Nonexistent

92C10566B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Apr 92 pp 1-5

[Article by J.Z.G. "No Hungarian Military Industry Yet"]

[Text] The scandal over the Pest Anna Machine Works directed the public's attention to the Hungarian military industry. However, Jeno Laszlo, director of the Bureau of the Military Industry and titular state secretary, remarked in one of his statements that there is, in fact, no military industry in Hungary. The goal of his bureau is to establish this branch of industry.

Jeno Laszlo stated that at the moment there is no military industry in Hungary, but only firms producing military articles. According to the state secretary, one can talk about a military industry as an organic part of the Hungarian industrial complex as soon as one-third of the technical equipment used by the Hungarian Army is produced by Hungarian industries.

At the moment the percentage of such equipment is minimal, since the bulk of military equipment comes from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. When asked about the Pest Anna Machine Works, Jeno Laszlo asserted that this plant is not a military factory either: it merely repairs equipment for the Hungarian Army.

According to Hungary's defense doctrine, domestic production must be established on the basis of the technological needs of the army since this is in the country's basic interests.

The first step in establishing this branch of industry will necessitate a familiarity with the most urgent technological needs of the Hungarian Army. This survey is expected to be finished by the end of this year. In Jeno Laszlo's opinion, the branch of industry which will be created in this way must be open [to competition], and at the same time the protection of defense interests must be assured.

Talking about the role of foreign investors, the state secretary pointed out that instead of capital investors, his bureau intends to assign a greater role to professional investors.

After the scandal surrounding the Pest Anna Machine Works, a new storm is building around the Godollo Machine Works, a factory which is also important to the army because one of its tasks is to repair tanks. The director of the Works declared in a statement that the future of the plant is uncertain because the previous guarantor refused to continue to act in this capacity after the firm's transformation. If the Godollo Machine Works fails to find a guarantor in the future, work must stop on 1 June and the work force must be laid off.

Jeno Laszlo declined to answer questions on the Godollo Machine Works, on the grounds of insufficient information.

Tamas Szabo: Bank Privatization To Continue

92C10566C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAPO in Hungarian 17 Apr 92 pp 1-14

[Article by E.P. "State Insurance Company Goes to Dutch Again—Tamas Szabo: Bank Privatization To Continue"]

[Text] The State Property Agency [AVU] held a press conference yesterday on the government's considerations of the privatization of banks and the State Insurance Company. As Tamas Szabo, minister without portfolio in charge of privatization, declared, in spite of voices to the contrary, bank privatization is to continue. Moreover, this year one or two banks will be partially privatized in the course of increasing their capital investment. The government has also adopted a strategy of privatizing banks largely owned by the state. On the basis of this strategy, the principal owner will make a decision on privatization, but every bank in question will be treated individually. Privatization must be preceded by a period in which the banks' portfolios are put into order, said Tamas Szabo, but he declined to say anything further on this matter, and he did not comment on how great the amounts are which the large banks still have outstanding in uncertain accounts, estimated by journalists to be 50-60 billion forints. Lajos Csépi [AVU director] later illuminated the background of this policy.

In a certain extent by saying that if the agency is able to sell a bank with a bad portfolio, it will do so, but if it is unable to proceed in this manner, the state must step in. Answering an unrelated question, he affirmed that a new guarantee by the state may also come into question.

The first steps in the strategy of bank privatization are designed to increase capital investment and not to sell the state-owned portions of the bank. A privatization partner will only come into question if this partner can supply the bank with fresh capital. The desirable new system of ownership would consist of a strategic investor (i.e., a professional partner), foreign and domestic institutional investors, and domestic small investors. It seems that the relative share of the various types of investors can be freely determined by the banks.

In order to carry out privatization, a new committee on bank privatization is being formed under the leadership of Lajos Szabo. Bank managements will also be asked to formulate their own concepts, however, disputed matters will be decided by the government, aided by a privatization consultant. By 1 May, bank managers will receive orders for their own tasks, and the compilation of the present privatization strategy is expected to be complete by the beginning of June. (In bank privatization, see also our editorial on p. 1.)

In carrying the privatization of the AB (State Insurance Company), Lajos Cséps explained that although the insurance company sent information to 14 possible partners, only one firm replied that it would be willing to join AB. It was the Dutch insurance company, Agnol, a firm well known on the European insurance market, which finally acquired the business. The Dutch company brought fresh capital into AB, and it also bought state-owned portions of the company. Its share in the property amounts to 75 percent. The bank capital of the insurance company thus rose from two billion forints to 3.9 billion forints. Although the state's share of ownership was reduced to 25 percent (there is also a 5-percent ownership by the employees), the state received gold stock in order to be able to maintain its special input in the company's matters, but only for five years. The AVI underwrote an 800-million-forint guarantee at the event that, due to new legislation, the insurance company has to pay any official company compensation for environmental damages. For similar cases the AVI has previously underwritten a guarantee of 10 billion forints, and it estimates that this year 3-4 billion forints' worth of guarantees will be cashed in.

State Audit Office Reports on State Debt

[EJ 1991/219; Budapest; MTI in English, 1409 GMT, 14 May 91.]

[1991] Budapest, May 14 (MTI)—At present Hungary's state debt stands at HUF 150bn (Hungarian forints) (150billion), says the latest report of the state audit office.

Last year the debt grew by HUF 35bn, partly as a result of the state budget deficit of HUF 114bn and partly

because of the devaluation of the forint which added nearly HUF 140bn to the debt. HUF 10bn of the present state debt is the result of funds devaluations between 1982 and the end of 1991. For exactly this reason, however, this part of the state debt does not carry interest.

The bulk of the remaining 140 billion state debt carries 7 percent interest, that is 60 percent of the Central Bank base rate for loans borrowed in 1990 from the NBH (National Bank of Hungary). A smaller part borrowed from foreign governments & the World Bank carries interest rates fixed in the relevant agreements.

Last year the state budget paid the full Central Bank base rate of 22 percent on loans borrowed from the NBH. The rate of state bond and treasury bill issues is financing the budget deficit is growing considerably. These papers carry annual interest rates of 20% & 15 percent.

This year HUF 172bn will be spent from the state budget on debt service. Capital repayment will amount to HUF 27bn and interest payments to HUF 145bn.

In the coming years annual interest payments will account for a growing proportion of the state budget expenditures because from this year the Ministry of Finance will not take over Central Bank loans to finance the budget deficit, but will finance the deficit through bond and treasury bill issues.

The planned budget deficit is HUF 10bn this year, but forecasts put the deficit as high as HUF 110bn by the end of the year.

It is not very likely that the income from privatization will make much impact on the state debt. Sandor Lencsik, vice president of the NBH, said at a press conference today.

There is no decision yet on how privatization matters will be divided between reducing the state debt and financing the annual state budget deficit. The decision in the matter rests with parliament. Jozsef Hageimayer, of the state audit office held the same press conference.

Impact of Budget Deficit on Social Benefits

[EJ 1991/219; Budapest; NÉPSZABADSAG in Hungarian, 22 Apr 91, p. 1.]

[Interview with György Szarvadi, Finance Minister's deputy state secretary, by Maria Lathos, plus and dist. not given. "How High Will the Budget Deficit Be?—Modification of Law Not Yet Complete—No Word Yet on Reducing Social Benefits"—first paragraph is NÉPSZABADSAG introduction.]

[Text] We do not yet have exact data on the budget deficit during the first four months, but the trend is clearly downward, declared György Szarvadi, the Finance Minister's deputy state secretary in charge of budgetary issues. It still does not seem possible to

forecast whether the more rigorous collection of taxes and tariffs can bring at least partial relief to the straitened budget. As yet, no reduction in social benefits is planned.

[Ladanyi] How high is the budget deficit now?

[Nagyvadi] It is impossible to tell at the moment, because, for instance, the advance payments of personal income tax were due on 25 April. We have no exact data on these amounts. Another due date is 28 April. That is to say, exact data will only be available at the end of the month. One thing is certain: The trend is steadily downward and the deficit is growing.

[Ladanyi] Then this year's budget will also have to be modified, although it seems this depends merely on the government's wishes.

[Nagyvadi] This is a great misunderstanding. The law on the state budget, which regulates all of these issues, has not yet been ratified, but at the time this year's budget was passed, the text of the budget stipulated that, in a case like this, a supplementary budget must be prepared. First, however, the government must do everything in its power to reduce the deficit. We have taken the first steps, but we cannot see clearly yet the path few weeks have been too short to show how much the strict measures will reduce the amount companies owe the budget.

[Ladanyi] Declaring bankruptcy deprives the budget of revenues, since the companies do not have to pay back these debts for three months.

[Nagyvadi] Many people think that this is so, but it is only the debts made up in the case of the bankruptcy which do not have to be paid. We don't know yet how many demands by the state were "frozen" because of bankruptcy. The real question is, however, what the cause of the deficit increase is, namely, whether companies have not paid their taxes up to now, or whether the GDP and (consequently) the revenues from taxes will not reach the previously calculated level and, thus, the decrease will be greater than expected.

[Ladanyi] If the second hypothesis proves to be true, the expenditures will have to be modified in any case. However, there are only a few places left from which money can be taken away. Mostly social expenditures could be considered.

[Nagyvadi] We don't want to touch family allowances, maternity benefits, or pensions. But unemployment compensation must be controlled better, because many people work and collect unemployment at the same time. This must be prevented by all means. We need to reexamine certain contributions to institutions, and we could reduce amounts given to various foundations, although we cannot expect great savings from this. One can call this fiscal terror, but we have no choice. We cannot look on while the deficit grows.

U.S. Cable Bid for Budapest TV News Fails

Ch. 1007's 1.1 Budapest (AP 108) in Hungarian
28 Apr 92 pp. 17-18

[Interview with Kálmán Gergely, head of the Hungarian Democratic Forum's foreign affairs division, (interview) Pálffy, an official of Hungarian Television, and Flórián Lajtha, president of the Soviet cable television company, to Tamas Free press and date not given.] "Assumption of Hungarian News Programs Ahead—Free Pressing for \$20,000—Emigres Are [sic] of the Future"—first paragraph is (AP 108) introduction.

[Text] No country would fail to take advantage of an offer of free broadcast time to an American cable television network, especially if that network was to use one thing in return, to deliver programs to the available time period. Well, that happened in the country that failed to grab such an opportunity with both hands, and that country was Hungary. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) entered into negotiations with the American television network about delivering programs of the Hungarian Television, and wanted \$20,000 annually for the recordings and an additional \$100 per video cassette. Tamas Free asked questions about this strange incident.

[Text] "Show me a country other than Hungary, that receives an offer from an American cable channel for broadcasting its television programs in the evening prime time hours, and does not take advantage of the offer because it is unable to mail a jammed videocassette." This quote comes from the internal, unpublicized message written by Hungarians in America, lacking a Hungarian television program. Hungarians in America are hardly in the picture even though having a television program would help these days. Informing these people would not hurt at all, if the MDF achieves its goal and Hungarians should obtain the right to vote in the 1994 elections. This is yet another reason why Soviet cable television network's offer to broadcast free of charge in the United States a half hour Hungarian program every day seems to be an outstanding opportunity. The only thing Soviet asks for is that the Hungarian programs be mailed to them on video cassettes. The first such offer was made to the MDF in February 1991, when Sándor Verhegyesi, a man of Hungarian descent residing in Switzerland and a friend of the television company head, walked in to the offices of the MDF. No agreement has been reached ever since. What does Kálmán Gergely, head of the MDF foreign affairs division, have to say about this?

[Gergely] Look, I am dealing with Hungarians residing abroad. This man did not just happen to walk in, he made an appointment and we received him.

[Free] Why didn't you direct him to the Hungarian Television?

[Georgy] We talked at length with János G. Pálffy of the Hungarian Television, and discussed what he thought of this whole thing.

[Frey] And why didn't you discuss this, let's say, with the Television's foreign affairs division?

[Georgy] Well, I don't know. It so happened that we called Pálffy to find out whether it was at all possible to record the television news programs and send those abroad.

[Frey] In the end, on what basis did you choose from among the television programs?

[Georgy] We did not choose anything. We have our own television staff, and they wanted to, or they would like to, do this.

[Frey] When an American cable television network offers an excellent opportunity to Hungary to broadcast Hungarian programs free of charge, do you think it is appropriate

[Georgy] Excuse me, not free of charge, there were some financial

[Frey] ... that is exactly what I was about to ask, did you go so far as to ask them to give you money?

[Georgy] By no means, this is why we would have needed, in other words, there were some rather serious financial investments involved, and therefore we simply needed an entrepreneur to do this.

[Frey] But you did not find an entrepreneur, instead, you asked Scita to give you money. I have the fax message in front of me.

[Georgy] We did not ask for any money, we needed an entrepreneur to record these programs.

[Frey] My dear lady, forgive me, but I have the fax message in front of me in which you asked for \$3,500 to cover the investment, and thereafter \$100 for each and every cassette.

[Georgy] Don't you understand? We did not ask for that money. László Poros did. Didn't he?

[Frey] Well, he is the MDF's public affairs man after all.

[Georgy] Yes, he is the one who deals with television matters on the public information committee.

[Frey] He sits in the room next door to yours. This is why I said "you."

[Georgy] But this is why I am saying that it was not the foreign affairs division.

[Frey] This is clear, but it is still the MDF.

[Georgy] In other words, it was requested by a professional.

[Frey] A professional, too, was involved in negotiating money. Because regardless of what Kálmán Georgy says, her signature also appears on the MDF letters sent to Scita, i.e. the two of them requested about \$20,000 for the MDF, in exchange for Hungarian—state—Television broadcast programs recorded on video tape. The fact that it took them more than 10 months to figure out how much to ask belongs in a ludicrous case. Thus, the MDF aspect of this case has been closed barely a month ago, when the American television company informed the MDF that it was not willing to pay for the programs, because they already incurred enough expenses by broadcasting the programs. Meanwhile, Scita also contacted the Hungarian Television, letters received by Elemér Hankins were referred to János G. Pálffy. This is proven by the correspondence regularly maintained at the TV president's secretary. Among things here, too, the footsteps end up in the editor in chief of the Herald news program, but he no longer recalls much of the events. Has the MDF asked you questions as to how to proceed in regard to Scita cable television network's request?

[Pálffy] I regret to say that I do not recall these events, but I do not rule out the possibility that the MDF, or perhaps the Americans, have come to see me. Things are happening every day, even if those things are not similar to this case, so that it got lost in my memory, but I do not rule out the possibility that they contacted me.

[Frey] And are you aware of the fact, or do you recall, that the same television company has written to Television president Elemér Hankins, and that he referred this letter to you, i.e. that in the end, Scita has reached you through that channel? Do you remember that?

[Pálffy] I do not recall that, we receive sacks full of letters every day, so that this, in itself, means nothing. But it is virtually certain that we did not have specific contact, a program contact [as published], I exchanged a cassette only on one occasion with an American Hungarian named Bela Buzs, he is experimenting with satellite broadcast in Los Angeles.

[Frey] How do you view the situation, did the MDF all property when it went so far as to ask money for the free of charge broadcast of Hungarian programs in the United States, or was this a bit too much?

[Pálffy] Television programs are the property of the Television, i.e. no one else has a right to negotiate financial matters or other matters involving royalties.

[Frey] In the final analysis there is some contradiction here, or there is a conflict of interest, to say the least. Everyone is talking about the benefit of providing information to Hungarians living in America, since conceivably they, too, could vote in the 1994 elections, isn't there an interest of this kind?

[Pálffy] Yes, there is.

[Feri] On the other hand, the implementation of this intent is hindered by providing programs only if the firms willing to broadcast these programs pay.

[Paddy] Well, there is a contradiction to be sure. It could be resolved if the Hungarian Television reached some kind of an agreement with, let's say, the World Federation of Hungarians, and the World Federation handled the distribution and ordering. This matter has an odd aspect. Programs we put together for consumption in Hungary, by Hungarians, are not always appropriate for broadcasting in places where viewers are interested in different things. I know that the cassettes they produce here under the heading "news reporting" are filled with Csandaskurtivno [censored] and similar things. I do not mean to be derogatory, but it should be obvious that neither Csandaskurtivno, nor any other secular entertainment piece would appear in a Hungarian news report here in Hungary. One has to add such things for consumption over there in other words. Hungarian programs are not quite appropriate [in America] unless changes are made.

[Feri] So the television company, president Francis Laiba is next in line. The question: What does he think of his adventures with the Hungarians?

[Laiba] We talked to the MDF and called the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, but we also maintained relations with the Hungarian Television. We received many promises, everyone, from the cultural attaché all the way to the MDF, promised to send us programs, but this has not taken place. We got farther with the MDF. There the subject of discussion included an agreement, but they wanted money. We were not willing to give them money. Sotha is a nonprofit television company. We provide services, and I tried to make them understand that in this case we are the ones who give something, not the Hungarians, because we provide a free of charge opportunity for you to address Hungarians who live in America.

[Feri] And what was the response?

[Laiba] The MDF's response was clear and unequivocal. We receive programs if we pay, we do not receive programs if we do not pay. I told them in response that we could not afford making payments and so they disappeared. I have not heard from them since. We have relations with 40 countries from Yugoslavia to Japan, and thus far no one has asked for money.

[Feri] At the beginning of our discussion you mentioned that you have been in touch with the cultural attaché of the Hungarian Embassy in Washington. Did your negotiations with him break off?

[Laiba] I saw him for the first time in February of this year. If I recall correctly, I sent him a fax message, then I repeated the message in March, then called him on the telephone. He appeared to be very enthusiastic and optimistic. It seemed that he wanted to help. Since then,

however—and I'm kidding—23 days have passed, and he has not returned my call. Despite this, I am optimistic about Hungary.

Problems of Agrarian Reform Viewed

J.N. MICHAEL Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Apr 92, p. 10

[Article by Yves-Michel Roux: "Difficult Agrarian Reform in Hungary"]

[Text] Taposzentmarton—As in most small rural Hungarian communities, the 6,000 residents of the village of Taposzentmarton live at their own pace. Only 30 km southeast of Budapest, the village was apparently spared by changes that have shaken the capital in the past two years. Here, transportation is mainly by bicycle and horses are still widely used for field work. In contrast with most cities, no one has yet tried (or dared?) to touch the "outward signs of socialism." The church square still bears Marx' name and the people's center is on Red Army Avenue. Today as in the past, the main employer is the Cooperative of the Golden Hind, set up at the time of the last forced collectivization in the early 1960's.

More than an employer, the cooperative sets the rhythm of town life with its soccer team and cultural center. As in most other villages in the country, the mayor and the cooperative president, the two pillars of local government, were reelected to their posts two years ago just after the first democratic elections on the national level. It represents a continuity in management, in contrast with the appeals for "purges" proffered by certain political leaders.

Even if Taposzentmarton did not go to the trouble of changing its facade, it nevertheless lives in troubled anticipation of a radical change. A law passed by the parliament in January provides for the privatization of all agricultural cooperatives between now and the end of the year. In the meantime, the 1,200 cooperatives that work two-thirds of the country's arable land are involved in painful negotiations over the distribution of land between employees, municipalities, original owners, and the heirs of those whose property was arbitrarily confiscated by the communists.

Triple Uncertainty

This monumental transformation, the most sweeping ever undertaken since the first postwar agrarian reform, is taking place against a backdrop of a triple uncertainty: a serious crisis of overproduction, an inevitable agricultural reorganization, and the conservative government's promise to "compensate the victims of the old regime" by giving them the possibility of buying certain land parcels from cooperatives.

Right now, it is the last point that concerns János Szabo, president of the Taposzentmarton cooperative for the past 16 years. He received a circular from the Indemnification Office in February asking him to reserve 1,500

hectares of land for those with "compensation contracts." However, he does not know how many persons will show up or whether they will want to rent the land from the cooperator or take it out of the system and run it on their own. "With a question mark hovering over a third of our land, it is impossible to plan our activities," he says. Furthermore, he is making no decisions beyond this year. All cooperatives face the water distribution problem as to what to do. Many farmers are not even planting crops. Throughout Hungary, concern for seed has dropped 10 percent in one year.

When they passed the new law on cooperatives in January, the deputies were not aware of these drawbacks. There was a double objective to promote a restructuring of agriculture, which accounts for 25 percent of the GNP, by giving new legitimacy to the cooperatives, now based on the principle of the free association of members. However, this gradual dismantlement has already begun. An order passed by the last session government authorizes original owners still living to take back land incorporated by force into the cooperatives. These are essentially aged persons whose members are more utilitarian and "bourgeois" than purely economic.

The situation is particularly striking in Tamascsanak, where, for the past year, 152 former cooperative members have withdrawn only 145 hectares. With an average of 1.08 hectares per family, working such land is clearly not

a profitable activity. For a person to buy more land, more Furthermore, most of these returned persons have neither the money nor the desire to invest in the equipment and fertilizer needed to improve their land. The result: Nearly half of the land taken out of the system has now been put up for sale.

Cooperatives

"There can no longer be cooperatives and provide a living for all cooperative members with one land and cropping system," says someone who, for all farmers, production costs have shot up in the past two years with the increase in bank interest rates and rising prices. Moreover, Hungarian agriculture, which accounts for a quarter of all exports and employs from 15 to 17 percent of the active population, has been hit particularly hard by the collapse of CMEA and the drastic reduction in government subsidies.

Cooperatives are therefore planning to privatize what half of them are in the end. "Extensive government for the division of land will now be necessary in the absence of socialist structures such as private distribution networks, banks, educational markets and commodity exchanges," observes economist Kalman Vékony. "It will be easy, but hard to transfer the old good farmers belonging to the cooperatives."

Political Figures Evaluate Walesa Presidency

KISZCZAK, Ryszard. GAZETA WYBORCZA. 28 Apr 1992 pp. 6, 11.

[Statements by former and current advisors to President Lech Walesa, compiled by Jaroslaw Kurcia, "The Leader—The Presidential Chapter"]

[Cont.]

[Photographs and brief biographies of the persons cited in the following article, with one exception—a black space in lieu of the photographs of employees of the Presidential Chancellery, who wished to remain their anonymity.]

Lech Kaczyński

Walesa's associate ever since his release from imprisonment at Ałtarnia. Vice chairman of NSZZ Solidarity Senate (1983-4). Following the resignation of Jacek Michalik, appointed to the post of treasurer of state for security at the Presidential Chancellery. Resigned in November 1991.

Jaroslaw Kurcia

Since June 1989 a close associate of Walesa and press spokesman for his presidency. Editor in chief of the weekly TYGODNIK WOLNOSPRAWY. Founder and leader of Center Accord Senate (1983-4). Left department 1991. From December 1990 until November 1991 head of the Presidential Chancellery with the rank of minister of state.

Grzegorz Goralik

Associate of Walesa during 1980-81 and after his release from Ałtarnia. A leader of the Young Poland Movement, now the Republican Coalition. Secretary of state for local governments at the Presidential Chancellery (from February until November 1991).

Jacek Michalik

Associate of Walesa ever since the martial law era and director of his electoral campaign. In December 1990 appointed to the post of treasurer of state for national security. Suddenly dismissed in March 1991; chairman of Solidarity Bank.

Artur Janaszko

A leader of the Young Poland Movement, vice chairman of the Republican Coalition. During 1983-88 secretary to Lech Walesa, member of his electoral staff. In December 1990 he became political advisor to the president, with the rank of undersecretary of state. Resigned in October 1991.

Krzysztof Wysocki

Co-founder in April 1978 of Free Trade Unions, which were afterward was joined by Walesa. TYGODNIK

WOLNOSPRAWY reported in October 1991 was one of the first to publish an article revealing the "power of the presidential advisors."

Jerry Milewski

Since July 1982 head of the Foreign Coordination Office of NSZZ Solidarity. In February 1991 he was appointed head of the National Security Office. Following the resignation of Lech Kaczyński, in November 1991 he became treasurer of state for security at the Presidential Chancellery.

High Official at the Presidential Chancellery

Wishes for persons who desired to remain anonymous.

...

We Were With the President

Krzysztof Wysocki I was greatly mistaken in my assessment of Walesa. Had I known what kind of president he would become, I would not have participated in his electoral campaign, which does not mean that I would have supported Mazowiecki. I would remain neutral.

Jaroslaw Kurcia Even before Janaszko's election to the Presidency, I worked in Gdansk as a K.R.W. [Solidarity's National Coordinating Committee] secretary, and already then I had a front-row view of Walesa's struggle for the Presidency. I had no doubt that that was his immediate goal.

I warned Walesa to be experimentally elected by the National Assembly rather than by popular vote, so that his term would be short and, were he to grow himself, he would have a chance to win the popular vote. Were he not to grow himself, or were he to lose the elections, either he would lose the elections, or a parliamentarization system with a Presidency of limited powers would be constructed. I always thought that Walesa would come to power, either by the road I proposed or through popular vote or at the head of a popular rebellion.

This last possibility was not certain. I consider a charismatic and world-famous politician, standing outside the political system who would say: "Once I begin to rule, things will get better." No government would withstand him. To me it was obvious from the outset that Walesa could not be ignored on our political scene.

High official at the Presidential Chancellery I am dividing Walesa's political career into two stages: before and after his election to the Presidency. During the first stage he had dreamed the name of national hero. During the second he has been displacing confusion and ignorance as to what to do with his victory at the polls. Walesa lacks elementary knowledge of the nature and functions of the government, knowledge he had not needed before his Presidency, and this is the problem today. The president cannot be a man who has not headed an organization in the work arena. But Solidarity

has never been strictly speaking an organization. It was a popular movement. Walesa has always been a leader, never the head of an organization.

Gregory Greshk: I do not regret having voted for Walesa in the presidential elections. He was a man who, in view of his standing and political background, was best fitted to lead the country in the direction of justice, a market economy, and stronger local governments. Unfortunately, he did not exploit this opportunity. If I am disappointed in the president, it is in the sense that in 1991 he failed to tell the Italian by announcing his authority to promote changes and instead designed his strategy on random political games.

High official in the Presidential Chancellery: The government of Poland did not become stronger when Walesa became president. Immediately after his election two concepts of the Presidency were considered: retention of the existing model, of course with some personnel shifts, or a fundamental restructuring as in the American model. The plan presupposed writing over the head individuals to the president's side and forming a shadow cabinet. However, implementing this plan would demand of Walesa hard work, total commitment, whereas he cannot tolerate nonpartisan dealings with persons who are unimportant, insignificant and prefer to focus on actual political life.

Gregory Greshk: The Presidency should be a constitutional office, but Walesa remains as confident as ever and keeps fighting his own establishment. Hence the need for "studium," for a minimum survival program. When one is president, one should think in terms of historical responsibility and from that standpoint what matters is not whether Walesa will stay in power, but whether and how he will lead the country through a period of difficult structural changes.

A Stock Exchange Dealing in Law Opportunities

Jenssen Kaczynski: On becoming president, Walesa had the opportunity to head the restructuring process, to renounce, in few words, on the principle of a coalition of forces rather than on the basis of a shattered coalition, the caring favoring changes in Poland and to shape these changes with a new disposition. He failed to exploit this opportunity. He became involved in strategic games consisting in showing up his personal influence and preserving the old communist system in, among other places, the military.

Krzysztof Wysocki: When the president, the commander in chief of the armed forces, military and constitutional old communist arrangements in the military and defense, Kozminski and Wawrzyniak, the dream that he emerges on his own calling.

The weakness with which he is breaking up the political system is a consequence of his radical failure to understand the nature of government. "The state and I," Walesa thinks—and to him both are equally important or perhaps even "I" counts to him more than Poland.

Gregory Greshk: Seen from the historical point of view, time has been lost and this era will be assessed negatively. I fear that we may lose our position now. I resigned my office not because I was ordered to do so by Walesa but because I lost the hope that I could promote, by executing the duties of my office, the gradual reform which the country needs on basis and to which the president should have become wholly committed. Besides, I had no support with him.

A Balance Sheet for the Last 18 Months

Krzysztof Wysocki: The one and a half years of Walesa's Presidency have not proved constructive in any way.

In the social department they were a total disaster. It had seemed that Walesa was the strongest of all, that there was nothing he did not know already. But the president did not enter the society and failed to move it toward new goals. At most he only talked about it, but it was words, not deeds, and this cost the patience of even single persons normally most susceptible to his rhetoric.

In the economic department the results have been less than zero. Privatization, instead of 100 percent from nationalization, of distributing 100 million zlotys against 10 percent, and slogans such as "Fix up your own factories."

In the field of foreign policy, nothing has been accomplished despite such favorable circumstances. We are being borne by the wave of history in a good direction, and for the present that seems enough. But the results are different. We shall not have to pay the price for our media, tourism, and payments there. Walesa has not accomplished or concerned anything. He has kept procrastinating. The situation for the Visegrad Triangle [trade partnership among Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary] did not come from him, although clearly it was supposed to be Poland's duty. Likewise, he has been a failure as far as relations with Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine are concerned. His private glorified single battles are. When even a person like Gromeka declares that Walesa is betraying Poland, this means that I can no longer be kept a secret.

It is in the political department that the disaster is at its greatest. The aim should be, but is not, to strengthen and stabilize the state. The history of betraying the west, treating down to our those who grow too much and pulling up those who fall and the (history of injustice and bribe) "top" (faction of Solidarity) were to make constant measures to degeneration and destroy political life. The progress toward the constitutional and the CPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement] are history, but in the sense of deviations from fundamental values.

Jens Mikkelsen: The newspapers talk about the crisis of the Presidency, but I perceive as such crisis. I view the Presidency positively and consider that it is only the beginning. A major accomplishment of the president is the concrete activity to perpetuate this constitution. I

firmly believe that toward the end of Wajnsa's term of office the stability of the Presidency will be strengthened.

Poland needs a leader, a man who would point in the direction to be followed. Such a person should be the president. In my opinion, Wajnsa is fit to be the president and I believe that, during the period of transition from communism to democracy, he is the best president we could have. Besides, he should have been elected earlier, immediately after the parliamentary elections last June. The election of Lipinski was a mistake that delayed the beginnings of the rebirth of democracy.

Janina Karczmak. Wajnsa resembled in the behavior (presidential palace) a center which is not fit for governing the state. To be sure, his actions at present are not directly leading to a disaster, but they are lowering the authority of the Presidency, causing confusion, and hurting democracy. The president is not utilizing his office to promote the reforms. He keeps saying that he wants to do so, but his functioning in this area is at the level of a factory team leader. The fundamental weakness of the president is that he has lost his former knack for negotiating with communist and politically savvy individuals. Nowadun flows in his character that formerly used to be straightforward owing to that negotiation are coming to the surface. His lack of education and sophistication casts a shadow on his Presidency. To be sure, he has kept his knack for promoting the alignment of political forces, but in this respect too, he is making mistakes. Example: Vampurs. His lack of political and moral support is causing the president to become a negative factor instead of inspiring and promoting restructuring.

Jerzy Milewski. The president shoulders the constitutional responsibility for national independence, sovereignty, and national security. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces and chairs the National Security Council (Foreign applications, Contributions for National Defense). Unfortunately, executive power supporting a proactive approach to these responsibilities remains unfulfilled to this day. This is a defect in legislation. The president is therefore responsible for matters over which he has little influence and concerning which his powers are unclear because they have not been spelled out in legislation. That also is why, when he takes action, hostile voices are heard that he intends to bypass the parliament and impose strong-arm rule for which he is not legally empowered. And consequently if he does not intervene in some or other issue, he is being criticized for his passivity.

High official at the Presidential Chancellery. Wajnsa has failed to acquire new skills, and his old skills proved unsuitable. His character traits make him unfit for the Presidency. He is himself guilty of this, and that is why he is so hostile toward Aleksander Hall who called it publicly. Wajnsa keeps saying that he can talk with Maniewski, but without "the captain, Hall and

Konopka." Hall struck at his weak spot. He said something that Wajnsa is proud and ashamed of.

The Loneliness of the President

Aleksander Bylski. Having failed to cope with the problems confronting him, Wajnsa got rid of those members of his immediate entourage who were politically important and asked difficult questions and subjected to various crises. Wajnsa became isolated, gave a few campaigns, and surrounded himself with yes-men. He isolated himself from his advisors, because they forced him to make efforts of which he was not capable. This is the loneliness of one who senses a disaster coming. In such a situation it is easier for him to declare that nobody understands his plans and the power elites are proving parasitic. He has forgotten that he himself is the cause of crises.

Wajnsa's associates now have to rely on the telephone to be in contact with him. He telephones them when he needs something, but to reach him by telephone one has to breach the protective wall of yes-men and bodyguards on whom rests the final decision as to contacting him, and who, being unfamiliar with politics, are creating political facts.

Jerzy Milewski. Wajnsa deliberately did not build up a presidential party of his own. Such a party could have arisen on the basis of common convictions had he agreed to it. But he believed and well believes that he should be a nonpartisan leader and president. In this sense he has indeed isolated himself. He draws the support of the majority of the society instead of any single grouping. He has chosen the easy, safe road.

The president lacks a circle of permanent advisors with whom to hold regular meetings. But this does not point to his isolation. His contacts with others, with the outside world, are lively and constant. He meets often with both supporters and opponents, not to mention his meetings with parliamentarian, chambers of deputies or editorial staffs of newspapers. This is the Wajnsa style—the same as when he used to be the chairman of Solidarity.

High official at the Chancellery. The television and radio are on all time. When Wajnsa speaks on the telephone, he talks softly, not into the handset but into the public-address console while at the same time crowing the TV screen and listening to the radio. This is distraction to all contacts and the conversation produces no results even though it was held. This is done deliberately: the president avoids having to make decisions.

Gregorz Goscini. It used to be Wajnsa's forte that he knew how to work with individuals representing the highest political level. Nowadun he is alone. Among the seven or eight most important Polish political parties I cannot find any committed supporters of cooperation with Wajnsa who believes that the better is the Guardians, or

which Poland's future shall be built. In this sense, the office of the president has for the time being been fulfilled.

Jack Markell: More than 4 billion zlotys [Z] remains in Walesa's electoral campaign fund. I thought that it should be spent sensibly and, together with Jozef Kuchinski, my deputy campaign chairman, I wanted to use it to establish a foundation for stopping the train from and keeping in this country gifted young people who would be identified by means of consensus. The authors of this idea were the sociologists and psychologists working with our campaign committee.

We went to the president to acquaint him with this project and obtain his approval. Walesa had us to be seated in armchairs. Before we even began to speak, he jumped up, crying "Tele-faxowa [program]!" He started up the volume full blast on the television so that I found it difficult to outshout the attraction. We accomplished nothing. Jurek [Kuchinski] was upset when we were leaving. It was then that he, a major fellow contributor to Walesa's success, decided to return to Gdansk. Afterward I learned that the president left to the Reverend Chabala the decision on what to do with the campaign fund.

Erzywiak Wydzowski: Some of Walesa's actions have become kind of autistic. It seems to him that he is doing something. He repeatedly speaks of, e.g., the EC or NATO. He becomes self-absorbed and doesn't take others' presence for granted. It seems to me that he is trying to create, but he himself is transparent to others and it is evident that the regime wants to destroy him.

Joseline Kaczynska: Walesa is ill with a pathological narcissistic love. The words he most often uses are "I" or "the president." "I" did it. "I" forgive it. "I" warned against it. I cannot tell what is the prime mover of his public activities, willpower or something more.

Walesa's Plan

Urbanowicz Olszka: Walesa could have called round himself a broad base of support for the reforms. But this would have required a clear vision of the goal and plan of action, identification of the most important Polish issues, and consistency in resolving them. Now, after even the closest of his associates have problems in perceiving the direction in which the president is moving.

Walesa did not want to be a slave to any plan. He did not believe in planning. Communism collapsed without a plan, so did the Berlin wall. It is difficult to oppose such arguments. He was attracted by the fact that the pope or John, Thatcher follow plans for several hundred days ahead. He said, "Only the good Lord knows what I will be doing tomorrow, so how can I tell what I will be doing in a year?" The lack of a timetable to be followed for the next few weeks has been a major weakness of the government during the period when I had served it.

The press speculation's explanation that the president has no solutions to every problem means that he has no solution whatsoever. [Wojciechowski agrees that Walesa is not a person who, like his wife, on a rational basis than he thinks it through.]

Jack Markell: Walesa had every opportunity to become the author of several major national undertakings that would secure his place in history. He had considerable "over support," international prestige, his own political party, associates, and, had he wanted it, even the support of the opposing party.

As the Solidarity leader and Nobel Prize winner, Walesa is already a historical figure. But he could have brought Poland into the EC and NATO and formed a modern military. Had he followed some scenario for the actions of his government, things would have gone. Walesa cannot act in accordance with a plan, though this is an elementary requirement for governing. Technically, in day-to-day and long actions, he is extremely active; he is put in a better mood than his associates so-called good deeds and the Holy Virgin charms them in the right direction. A president should be a strategist, but unfortunately, Walesa is not. This contributes nothing to his prestige nor to the prestige of the state.

The Daily Life Struggle at Legnica

Urbanowicz Olszka: The absence of specific goals, the continuing tension, and the distance from what Walesa's equilibrium and core membership position was a nightmare. Walesa doesn't wish people to get out, does not want to offend. He feels that the situation is too much for him. That is why I believe him when he speaks of wanting to resign, of not opposing his President. When his comments in the press are considered, this nightmare is evident in every statement affirming that the last 15 years is the worst period in his life. "I don't want to but I have to"—this statement reflects a genuine inner battle.

Jack Markell: As the Solidarity the prevailing belief is that the so-called book [having something in common, knowing their little secrets] is the instrument for exercising power. Whoever has the book, he has power. Whoever has more books, he has more power. This principle is universal and therefore books are being accumulated in Walesa's bedroom too.

As early as in the earliest days, Walesa followed the principle that it is better to know a known inferior in his immediate entourage than to remain firm and to govern of the interests of his conscience. I then gave that it would be convenient for the president to have in his entourage a known, say, KGB agent, with discreditable evidence to hand. I did not provide him with this information. I do not know and he did not want to know. When Walesa considered his cooperation with the regime, with joining to me a number of phony letters, accusing me of disloyalty, or a reaction to my having opposed actions, not based on any clearly formulated plan, of

national. The point was to get rid of the President, to open out of himself some, the very idea of dissolving him and integrating with the rest of the country.

Janina Milewska Several months after Merle's dismissal the president offered to nominate him to the position of a unique minister of national defense. But Merle declined the offer because he was bound by the terms of his contract in the character of Solidarity. He said that the president knew having some negotiations about his contract he would not have made this offer to him.

Andrzej Wroblewski There was some change in power of the liberal movement in which the main national interest. His particular in terms a cover for dirty dealing. Gdansk began referring to his exhaustion, his only friend of work etc. All this is pure idealization. The President is "blind" meaning that it is effectively continuing the fact that nothing is being accomplished here. But there is a reason there that has to be filled by dirty deals. For example, the entire concept of Poland's membership in the Council of the EC and NATO is based on a system of financial aid for covering up total poverty. The subsidies are being taken in hand and this system is planned over.

Georgina Kozlowska I understand Poland's political commitments and reflect Gdansk's potential political problems. In Gdansk political movements are so intertwined with public interests that it is difficult to separate them from it. If anyone however he would not be content with a good personal change in the present of lowering economic problems.

5. Computer

High official at the Chancellery From the beginning Janina Karwinska had been progressing in Gdansk's challenging her dangerous path in which there stood to take action or defend, to summarize—building together a coalition against the [Communist] Union, that is, against the majority of the intellectual class. Gdansk was involved, he knew it would be to be and out Karwinska who would bear political responsibility for any action. Karwinska was concerned with dividing public opinion into several significant segments.

Karwinska's governmentship suggested an element of hesitating, but it must be admitted that his political position was extremely hard. The idea was to dissolve the Senate in the process of an election to the electoral college while the Polish Constitution the president has the right to dissolve the parliament upon certain conditions. That would result in dividing public opinion into Gdansk's opponents, who would only want Communism to end, and a center-right or Christian-Communist pro-electoral camp, and in the subsequent polarization into two major forces that would stand at the elections and subsequently in the Senate.

Karwinska is unfortunately opposed to Gdansk, who acted in fact for some ideas. He was difficult to convince, being a sort of character and building definite political views.

He did not want to Gdansk's authoritarian character should have to their superior. If a political plan exists, individuals who in that plan are selected, that there was no plan, and so it was difficult to achieve political declarations of loyalty. Nevertheless Gdansk has an ideology which, in a sense, has declined "in the dark" in truth to Lech Gdansk rather than to Poland or to political goals. Karwinska was attracted for this.

Janina Karwinska Gdansk showed enthusiasm in accepting forward the idea of elections and having good elections laws passed. In this matter her role was it the right. It was so who had engaged in this, in this matter a struggle that had to be waged continuously until the end, until the dissolution of the parliament. I need to be an attempt in the parliament to pass election laws, laws would have been a good rationale for its dissolution.

Lech Karwinska Mr. Karwinska and I had the idea of dividing the Solidarity camp into two opposing political forces. Gdansk supported this idea and began to speak in the end for two legs, one right and one left. He emphasized the Center Board, which promoted the formation of the Solidarity movement's ideological, Christian, Catholic. But that was not the end of it. Gdansk the end of a third, a fourth even a seventh "leg," and at a certain moment we reached the conclusion that he was guilty in the functioning of his power to maintain legitimacy and differentiate the political water. Because that was to his advantage. Gdansk proved to be a hard partner of our attempt but only the first six weeks. Afterward he tried to prevent the Center Board from becoming a major force. In 1985-1986 about 25 regional committee committees wanted to join the Center Board, but he blocked them from doing it.

and this is characteristic of Gdansk. At the same time (Janina Karwinska) kept pushing toward the goal, which does not mean that he was a threat to Gdansk, who however, at some was a competitor or enemy who stands on independent position of his own.

High official at the Chancellery Gdansk was not to be used of the Karwinska brothers, but the information that they are plotting and cooperation, which will show that they work hard. They have nothing to do and do their job. While Janina Karwinska was the head of the Presidential Chancellery, it performed well the same some checkwork. Nevertheless work at that office is expanding and unorganized matters are piling up. The new kind of the Chancellery is Zolnowski, but actually it is administered by Wroblewski.

6. Looking for Solidarity

High official at the Chancellery Gdansk is Gdansk, but like in a stable go. He perceived the transition of the organization and found the former communists, he believed that communist individuals would be even capable to understand would think of the door, door before entering—and would not get anywhere. A door will never first and know later.

Lech Wałęsa's press spokesman (Chruszczak) declared on the radio that the letters are such that we could honestly, honestly, honestly perceive them. He directed his criticism at the rank of some people like Wałęsa and Chruszczak can always be found without the least question. Chruszczak is aware that one day there could be the last day of their career. Such are the rules of the game, which they accept fully. Chruszczak holds forth that whatever is happening at the Belvedere is a question of style—even obvious gaffes.

Anonymous Wałęsa Wałęsa, who considers the enormous burden of having to do good, is cautious, and tries to avoid, to gather around him individuals who represent pragmatism, cynicism, bitterness, and even—in a word, the contrary of good. He is not a character, rather a person, in the manifestation of ideas, but he has also a particular psychological makeup and is a person concerned for his own, personal gain. Sometimes that leads to financial matters for him. Therefore, he has to be surrounded by persons loyal to him who depend exclusively on him, because without him there are nothing. They cannot be politicians or individuals who would betray him in one way or another. They have to be his faithful slaves, so that by denying personal advantage from being associated with the president, they could also be advantageous to him. This mechanism results in attracting a growing number of persons of doubtful morality and creates a circle-forming climate within the president's entourage. Well, to surround himself with such people is an essential psychological need for Wałęsa.

A Game of Musical Chairs at the Court

High official at the Chancellery The Belvedere Press Clerk Chruszczak lives in the same place as the president. Minister Wałęsa and Press Spokesman Chruszczak are practically never away from him. This is dictated by mutual interests. Wałęsa, away from his family, both lonely and lost, he looks for support and company. These persons in turn fear losing access to him should somebody at their official position their goals, feelings. Thus, Wałęsa with himself off from the world by means of his barriers, toward cynicism and the cynicism represented by his entourage. As a consequence, his immediate entourage shapes his view of the truth and selectively controls the access of information to him. Such loyalty and cynicism, creeping on almost invisible, a fertile ground for intrigues and manipulations.

High official at the Chancellery Wałęsa is aware of his own situation. He perceives Poland's dramatic situation and is incapable of remedying it. He receives daily reports on the state of the nation. But, for example, at his morning press articles means receiving reports on Lech Wałęsa. The information is a personnel with includes both important matters and examples from the most serious presidential press, his caricatures, etc. He reads itself about himself and has no longer enough time to familiarize himself with important reports. He feels embarrassed when the press criticizes him.

High official at the Chancellery The members are aware that outside they are considered mediocrities. They know who and when criticism starts, and they keep each other informed about it. In other power centers in the world the situation may be similar, but in the Belvedere power centers react to power itself in a constant struggle to preserve one's place in the hierarchy of power.

Anonymous Wałęsa I was not in daily contact with the president. After discussing with him some issues or other, I would leave him, even though he wanted to include me in his "court" and maintain an office at the Belvedere. I was not interested. As long as I had thought that Stanisław Kukuła, was the president's closest adviser there, that could be said the Belvedere. My continued presence would have been degrading to me.

High official at the Chancellery The president's staff have no opinion of their own. Yet they are skilled at finding themselves in every situation. They are capable of convincing the president for a poorly founded but, that not for his mistakes. They are unwilling to question his half-baked or erroneous notions. Normally, personal interests for each person is very disconcerting. Wałęsa's men are aware that they happened to work at the Belvedere quite fortuitously. They believe that, once they find right important posts, they do not have to fear revolutionary changes. It would. They consider it a higher duty to stay in office which should be under them. Thus do not contribute to the progress of the government. In the Belvedere, both personally and behaviorally with the resignation of one agency. A job starts to equal from the head.

Jack Marshall A democratizer should have competent managers and subordinates who would suggest to him suitable solutions and bring documents ready for signing. Otherwise everything begins to become a farce, as in the case of the appointment of Lech Wałęsa to the post of minister of legal and national security, or in Chruszczak's poem "It Is History."

It happened when the Kaczyński brothers and Marek Zieliński were leaving the Chancellery. Lech Wałęsa was accompanied to the Belvedere and returned there by Minister Wałęsa, who considered as both his appointments. Circumstances as to to protect him with the latter previously mentioned by Lech Kaczyński. Wałęsa asked what about the post of secretary of the K.O. (National Defense) (secretariat). "There will be much in a minute. They bring the horse, but it has not been asked," said Wałęsa. "What about?" "What K.O.?" Then Wałęsa gave him a short outline of the law, the Constitution, the president, the president, and the secretary of the K.O. "Who is he?" asked Wałęsa. So Wałęsa continued to lecture. On the way to home, carrying Marshall as the secretary to some unknown general, and then carrying Zieliński, although he had never seen his name of appointment. Well, was he it was for me? It was a disaster. "The Kaczyński should be accompanied at other the son of the large is coming," Wałęsa said up with large Wałęsa. "I know."

waiting in his office. Because it is Friday afternoon and he wants to fly to Warsaw, his plane is waiting at the airport with the engines revved up. "When the party is broken, the problem is big. Water flows into the barrel and the barrel is made," Wachtowski tells the telephone and calls the Chancellery. "Was Zaleski appointed?" "Don't know." "Find Zaleski at once. Send a car for him." There is a pause. Zaleski is nowhere to be found. "You said. This happens to my barrel. Better call the barrelmaker quickly." Wajnsa gets there and tells General Fiedalski. Zaleski is located. He mentions that he is the secretary. A letter of recall and another of appointment are rapidly prepared. Wajnsa signs both and moves for the airport. The Polish state is fortunate. It now has a KGB secretary.

Jurgen Kaczmarek: Wachtowski once asked me to meet with Wajnsa in order to have him and Derzowski appointed as secretaries of state. He wanted me to do it "in a kind of a peace treaty" with me, while at the same time threatening that he could get the appointment on his own anyway. I went to Wajnsa to voice the objection. He said: "You are better. In this way to be secretaries of state? What?" Yet several months ago they both got those posts.

High official of the Chancellery: I know that Wachtowski asked Kaczmarek to help him and Derzowski get promoted. When Kaczmarek refused several months later very warm themselves letters of appointment and got Wajnsa to sign them. There were many reasons why they wanted to get appointed to those posts. For one thing, Derzowski thus became the official superior of Ruch, and Wachtowski the official superior of Komsomol Poles. Secondly, the promotion entitled them to a large official apartment. In this red stucco apartment at 111 Sobieskiego Street are now becoming converted into diplomats.

Jurgen Kaczmarek: Wajnsa's judgment of human motivations is flawed. His feeling that everyone is his enemy is born on personal gain and promotion sometimes results in amusing situations. If he wants to punish someone, he threatens, "You will get nothing for half a year." Wajnsa knows that it presently has political smaller names half a year is like an eternity. But on the other hand he does not realize that there are people who follow other goals in their lives.

The Butler's Work

Jurgen Kaczmarek: Nowadays the assessment of the President is extremely critical. I did not expect everything to be black-and-white but I had not thought that things would be so bad as they are now. I did not know Wachtowski.

Lech Kaczmarek: Wachtowski is an influential personality and his role in the government is huge. He is also dangerous and capable of anything. His presence in the Belvedere is an insult to the country. He is trying to gain influence on, and setting up a far-right web of underground arrangements, those distances of public life which he

considers essential, and his judgments about their future is not consistent. In other words, the armed forces, the special services, the Eastern policy and thus influence the banking system.

Jurgen Kaczmarek: I am not denying that it would be difficult to prove that Wachtowski is a danger threat to the country. Certain information has unfortunately to be accepted as fact. Wachtowski is someone. I am referring chiefly to events for which there are concrete terms. Thus there was the execution of damages from Wajnsa's speech in Brussels, or the frequent presence of General Kozminski in Wachtowski's office. A person who has never been to the Belvedere cannot be aware that Wachtowski is playing a dangerous role.

Already the very fact that someone with a highly diverse as all, whose background is strange, and who lacks the political and professional qualifications, has become a secretary of state and one of the most influential individuals in the country, is in itself the main disturbing.

Major assessments have been made concerning Wachtowski, but I have never observed independent proof of them. What data are provided to a study of his background, especially from the moment he first had appeared with Wajnsa in 1980 and of his character traits. There also have been various signals from other countries.

Let the state secret facts about how concerned they public opinion.

Wachtowski is at the center of clandestine military networks, including those in the special services. He is close to contacts with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially with General Wierent, the commander of the Vojvodina units of the Internal Security Corps (KBS), whom he tried to appoint the director of internal affairs. As known, the KBS is the last surviving remnant of the [interim] regime. Its officers had been selected even more carefully than the officers of the old Bezpieczestwo (Interim Security Service). It had been assumed that that regime that in the event of a crisis in the Republic the KBS was to be the military formation of last resort, maintaining the maximum discipline and the maximum armed forces.

Wierent is a general of the old interwar pedigree. His cooperation with Wachtowski has acquired various forms, of which the most dangerous was the nomination of the Belvedere by KBS personnel, or even for the so-called daily meal ration, which turned out to be very dangerous. Wierent has often visited with Wachtowski, who has repeatedly defended him like a lost soldier, one and before Wajnsa. When Wachtowski began to go and get the position of minister of internal affairs for Wierent, upon questioning on every occasion the question of Minister Wierent, everything began to fall into a logical whole. For then Wierent would be the second, after Kozminski, committed minister dependent on Wachtowski. Fortunately his career-strings ended in failure.

In the past, when entering the President's office one hanging in the courtroom the characteristics has and images of an admiral. I had no doubts that they belonged to Mieczysław Karłowicz. After all, we do not have many admirals in the Polish navy. At first I had thought that he was visiting Wałęsa, whom I was going to see, and I even feared that his visit would prevent the seeing the president. After getting, however, I realized that Karłowicz was visiting with Wałęsa.

For a long time Wałęsa's closest Wałęsa against the idea of the (Poland-Germany-Soviet) Triangle and specifically against Poland and the Hungarian Premier Kadar. Then suddenly he changed his mind. I had thought that this was prompted by Wałęsa but later I found out that this was due to Wałęsa's influence.

In brief, Wałęsa has been exerting an enormous adverse influence on fundamental national policy issues. What is worse, this not because he is a better educated citizen. On the contrary, there is a certain pattern of thought to it, which makes me very suspicious. When I try to deduce Wałęsa's motives from his actions, I would say that this concerns preserving the institutional system of power breaking and obstructing a policy of rapprochement and stronger ties with the West. This acting in three dimensions has been more than politics.

High official at the Chancellery. Wałęsa is strategically very familiar with the language understood by the people of the former "apparatus." He knows how to make verbal threats and unspoken hints which alert the former apparatus. "The power in Poland belongs to the president, and it is the president's will that this or that, was known, undisturbed," he says.

Lech Karłowicz. Wałęsa has been practicing the technique of "successive narrowing down" on Wałęsa's former associates. The first to be fired was Karłowicz Pano, followed by Karłowicz Rydzka. As regards me and my brother, he had repeatedly proposed to us that we should for fundamental reasons, we should leave. Besides, as a rule, he does not keep his word. He openly admitted that he was going to decide who would go and who remain at the Chancellery. He repeatedly referred to "the president's will, although it remained unknown. He displayed an unusual self-confidence. I cannot account for his phenomenal career. He had resigned after seven years, in November 1976, and within a couple of years, he became Wałęsa's number one. He has once been in almost uninterrupted contact with Wałęsa, and with the latter's family, as well. I think that his determination and personal services satisfy Wałęsa's psychological needs."

There are matters commonly known at the Chancellery that are immeasurably difficult to prove. Minister Wałęsa was only once caught by Pano in the act of embezzling and appropriating \$1,000. But the president made him return the money and thereafter the matter ended.

High official at the Chancellery. In December 1980, Wałęsa, referring to a substantial will of the president, received \$1,000 from S.M. the representative of S.F. an American millionaire of Polish origin who was friendly with Wałęsa. In his conversation with S.M. Wałęsa claimed that the president was in a poor financial situation and therefore, on his behalf, he was requesting \$5,000 annually for the upkeep of the president and his family. He received the \$1,000 in the first payment. Feeling upset, however, S.M. contacted Pano who then contacted Karłowicz Karłowicz, who in his turn mentioned the matter to Wałęsa. Wałęsa was ordered to return the money, without being otherwise perturbed in any way.

Lech Karłowicz. Wałęsa's opinion was growing the more he considered. I assume that initially he had wanted to remain an influential chief of staff to Wałęsa but later he concluded that he could attempt to exert control of the Chancellery. I fear that the Wałęsa problem is being involved in the political arena, apparently, on the principle that while the Karłowicz brothers claimed that Wałęsa is a threat to the country, this danger for me.

Jacek Milewski. I am unaware of any information directly arranged by Minister Wałęsa, according to Karłowicz. I do not know of any Secretary of State Wałęsa, a Wałęsa's chief of cabinet, and hence he organizes the schedule of the head of state. This is an extremely important, difficult and dangerous job. In the United States a similar role is performed by the "White House chief of staff" who although not formally a member of the government, is known to be one of the most influential members of the president's entourage. Wałęsa plays an important role, but one guarding that Wałęsa is in some way under the control of his chief of cabinet who pulls the strings in movement. No one has ever succeeded in this. President Wałęsa is simply an amateur in this role's control.

Karłowicz Wałęsa. Wałęsa is not being guided by any historical goals. It is the ambition of politicians to be positively mentioned in the history of the state and the nation, but in Wałęsa, the only goal is to remain in power and to get and have fast. All of a sudden somebody without a past, who has never done anything for the country, has become the second most important person in the nation. He was even received by the British queen. It seems just that history is garbage, that it can be made like an aging man's legend, and asked, while the remains remain. That someone like Wałęsa can decide the fate of a great nation like the Poles in the laughing eyes of history. But this confuses too, Wałęsa's vision of the world.

The Dark Mirror of the President's Soul

High official at the Chancellery. I attribute Wałęsa's rise to the fact that he has been extraordinarily fulfilling Wałęsa's even, well, in matter how often. Moreover, he is an excellent psychologist for a familiar with Wałęsa's needs. He knows how to cheer him up, flatter

him, or make him nervous so as to keep him in the right sense mood, which Walesa likes. Lastly, he is available 24 hours daily. He is in the Belweder all day and all night. After all, no normal human being could stand it.

Barryatyl Wysocki: Wachowski is creeping around Walesa as a stamper of disdaintfully, cynically, and venomously peculiar treatment of national interests and emotions of state. This is being done on the principle of relieving psychological tension. Some people get drunk, others curse, while others will shut themselves up in the bathroom and shout. Wachowski releases Walesa with a potent dosage of grossly expressed contempt for the world, laced with humor and a feverish, if not morbid, kind of cheerfulness. Were Walesa by nature better educated and more sophisticated, he would find this to be intolerable. Thus, Wachowski is nothing else than Walesa's shadowy other, his "black" side. He does not have two faces, his own face is generally opaque.

Jaroslav Kaczynski: Wachowski is satisfying various kinds of Walesa's needs, especially psychological ones. Perhaps he has something on Walesa? I do not know. Wachowski himself told me that Walesa keeps throwing him out of his office several times daily and almost literally wiping the floor with him. On the other hand, he attaches tremendous confidence to Wachowski's opinion. Wachowski is alert and intelligent. He has guile, the criminal kind of guile, being ready to do anything to gratify the president. I have repeatedly posed the issue of Wachowski in my talks with the president, as the principal topic of our dispute, but whenever I demanded his removal I always received an evasive answer.

Barryatyl Wysocki: In order to veil properly one's private life one has to find individuals who would not be loyal to the values publicly expressed by Walesa. This is the secret of Wachowski's success.

Wachowski is always seen in the president's entourage, but publicly he does not exist, grants no interviews, and does not explain anything. That is his function. He is to be visible only to the president. He is to attend only to "dark" matters. Besides, if the problem is viewed pragmatically, such matters do not have to be so secret. Certain things can of a certainty be made public, as for example by acknowledging that money is needed and the president has somehow to get it.

The Moscow Plot—The Hour of Trial

Lech Kaczynski: The news about the coup in Moscow reached me at the very dawn. I immediately left for my office and called the president, but he told me that he had already spoken with someone and did not need me. I was not invited to the Belweder. It was then that I had decided to resign from my post as minister of state for national security, although, for various reasons, I submitted my resignation much later, just before the elections.

Jaroslav Kaczynski: At that time, I and my brother had been trying to obtain guarantees from NATO. It looked

like the Moscow coup provided an occasion for this, but everything went wrong. Walesa rejected an interesting offer of mediation in this matter. Moreover, to our astonishment, he did not want to convene a meeting of the National Security Council, he claimed that he needed no advice.

The Yaworski Parish resumed its contact with Walesa. I ceased to visit the Belweder. Besides, I had been keeping my letter of resignation in a drawer since last spring. Like my brother I adopted a resigned attitude in awaiting the elections, fearing gross attacks ahead and being "damped" in connection with the TELEGRAPH affair.

Lech Kaczynski: I decided to act through my frequent contacts with the prime minister. Bielecki appointed a special taskforce at the ministerial level which discussed in addition to a general assessment of the situation, the threat to the eastern border, not so much by the Soviet army as by refugees. I tried to persuade NATO's reporters as regards Poland and other countries of East Europe. I believed that the Moscow coup afforded an opportunity for Poland's obtaining certain guarantees from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The information coming from the West made this belief seem realistic. Everything took place within 48 hours, and everybody was aware of the scale of the events and of the resulting dangers.

On 19 August I had officially proposed convening the [National] Security Council, but soon afterward, in the afternoon, I learned that nothing would come of it. Lech told me, "I am like a fish in water and I am handling it all, and Minister Wachowski is helping out." He made it clear that it was exclusively his affair.

Jerry Milewski: The president presumably did not convene the National Security Council because he did not think that it would markedly assist him or the government in this matter. Besides, any member of the Council has the right to convene its meeting, but not one had demanded it, neither the minister of foreign affairs nor the minister of national defense nor the minister of internal affairs, nor the prime minister. The president conferred with members of the Council singly or in small groups, through secretaries with the Council as a whole and never at the Army Headquarters offices of the National Security Office, but rather several hundred meters farther at the Belweder.

Jaroslav Machal: The president did not convene the National Security Council, a body established especially for such occasions, because as he contended, he appointed some informal, unconstitutional body whose members other than Minister Dzierzyska, Minister Wachowski, and the chaplain, Major Alfred Fiedorowicz Cichalski, were unknown.

Jerry Milewski: The prime minister had appointed an interministerial crisis taskforce. During the Moscow Parish the presence of 45,000 Soviet troops stationed on

Poland became a threat. Strategically considered, this was not a big force, but it was sufficiently big to organize some provocation.

Lech Kaczyński: I and my brother persuaded Wałęsa not to engage in the next round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, especially considering that Ambassador Kasheiev on being summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that the new [Moscow] government should be treated as something permanent, whereas in our assessment the putch was collapsing. The Russian side did not know itself whom to represent. Yet the Ministry of Foreign Affairs desired the talks, and they took place, without making any progress though.

Jerry Milewski: I headed the National Security Office and was deputy minister of state for national security. The National Security Office has no executive powers, and no military or police formation is subordinate to it. It merely gathers and analyses information for the benefit and use of the president and members of the National Security Council, as well as formulating proposals. We maintained our officers round the clock and waited for the events to unfold.

An Unrealized Scenario

Jack Morket: If a military putch of basic importance to the security and sovereignty of Poland takes place in a neighboring big power, the machinery of state should be set in motion in accordance with a secret preset plan. The president should convene an immediate meeting of the National Security Council at which the ministers of national defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs would present their reports. He should also appoint an antiterror taskforce. Under his constitutional powers, he should likewise convene an extraordinary session of the government. At the same time the president's press spokesman should proclaim his message to the nation.

The president, who is at the same time the commander in chief of the Polish armed forces, had the duty of appearing on TV with a patriotic message, such as had been proclaimed by President Kennedy during the Cuban crisis or by [Polish Foreign Minister] Beck following Hitler's ultimatum. That is how history is made. The resulting address could have been covered in the canon of Polish political speeches. But what actually happened was that Minister Dyziewski recited word-ends some text. That was not what the nation had been expecting at such a dramatic moment.

Amazement, feelings of insecurity, and growing fear of personal security. I heard that Wałęsa ordered strengthening his bodyguards, nervous phone calls to Jaruzelski and [the ex-Minister of Internal Affairs General] Kiszczak—this was how the president had behaved during the first hours of the putch. If one telephones Jaruzelski, who has influence with the potential victors of the putch, this means disbelief in the ability to control one's own army. That is not how the head of an independent state behaves.

Aryszel Wysocki: Wałęsa was urged to speak out on television. But he waffled and finally refused. The need for a public address by the nation's leader in the face of potential danger to Polish statehood was so obvious that Prime Minister Bielecki volunteered to deliver it himself in front of the cameras. But after he had drafted the text of his address, Wałęsa forbade him to deliver it.

Jaruzel Kaczyński: Wałęsa evidently believed that the putch would be victorious, although Bush's comments indicated that it was collapsing. After all, Bush would not pose the issue clearly and engage in a confrontation with a long-established power that owns 30,000 nuclear warheads. Yet already as soon as Monday afternoon Bush took an incredible firm position.

Until the last moment Wałęsa ignored Yeltsin and bet on Gorbachev. I believe that this reflects his political infantilism and dependence. I do not know whether it was under the influence of the press or owing to some other signals that he declared, "That Yeltsin is a trap."

High official at the Chancellery: Wałęsa believed that he pursued a splendid policy on Russia by adopting a wait-and-see attitude and showing no sign of support for any contesting party, except to support Gorbachev.

High official at the Chancellery: It was being seriously suspected that the KGB, which survived as an imperial structure, is engaging in espionage activities in Poland with the object of maintaining a weak government in our country. While there is no proof of this, many interesting considerations exist.

Jaruzel Kaczyński: Even long before the putch, mediators had been proposing a spectacular meeting between Wałęsa and Yeltsin during the papal visit. A reconciliation between the Polish and Russian nations was then to take place. That was the most far-reaching signal, but I do not know how feasible that idea was. Other signals came too.

Lech Kaczyński: The putch collapsed. The [Polish antiterror] taskforce pondered for several more days the relations between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Everyone expected a rapid finish for the former. Thus, the Belweder's stubborn adherence to Gorbachev was completely incomprehensible. I also happen to know that [Wałęsa kept] postponing making a telephone call to Yeltsin, despite the pressure exerted by my brother. Technical difficulties were supposedly the obstacle. I do not know whether this is true, but I do know that others had no problem in reaching Yeltsin by telephone.

Jerry Milewski: The president did telephone Yeltsin, for which he was thanked by him afterward. For technical reasons, and also owing to the long line of leaders of many countries who also tried to contact Yeltsin by telephone, the Belweder was very late in securing that contact, and as for Gorbachev it was unable to reach him at all. Bush and Mitterand were able to make contact, but other national leaders were not.

Jack Merkl: I find Walesa's conduct to be extremely terrible, unacceptable and unjustifiable. I am also opposed to the manner in which Walesa represented Poland in his conversation with Yeltsin. When finally as one of the last national leaders in Europe he had "succeeded" in reaching the Russian president by telephone, millions of television viewers beheld a sweaty Walesa wearing a shirt with the sleeves rolled up and the necktie loosened, with a newspaper lying on the desk and with Wachowski crouching behind his armchair and handing him some "urgent" papers to sign. Elementary courtesy toward one's fellow citizens requires that an official and extremely important address be delivered on television under appropriate circumstances.

A Shameful Correspondence

High official at the Chancellery: The absence of consistent treatment of the eastern question resulted in that Walesa did not know how to act when the punch erupted. At the last moment a congratulatory letter to Yanayev was snatched from his hand. He had expected that the punch would entail major changes and that the SDRP (Social Democracy of the Polish Republic) would become a major political force. He also thought that in being the first to write such a letter he would not lose the initiative. Anyone can make a mistake, but Walesa's eastern policy was simply fortuitous.

Jerry Milewski: The president tried to establish contact by telephone with all three, Yeltsin and Gorbachev and Yanayev. I took no part in the discussions of this issue. Insofar as I know the dominant view was that the seizure of power by doctrine (communists), the army, and the KGB would be a major threat to our sovereignty. Reason d'état required acting with the greatest deliberation. The assessment was that Yanayev should not be justified in thinking that the Polish Government was opposed to him. The president did not speak with Yanayev. I do not know whether a letter was dispatched to him. I was not among the persons who decided on this matter. I have not seen any such letter or its draft. Had I assumed in drafting such a letter, I would opt for including the following language: "We are and intend to remain an independent country; we have no claims against the USSR; we expect a rapid completion of the negotiations for and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland; the agreements for the shipments of crude petroleum and natural gas will not be broken."

That would not be a letter legitimizing Yanayev. It would provide a kind of political protection against attempts to once again include Poland in the empire were to be restored by the coup plotters, in the event that the coup were to be successful. I believe, however, that no letter was dispatched. Fortunately, the punch collapsed quickly and there was no contact with Yanayev. No such contact could have been possible anyway, considering that the coup plotters were too busy to think of Poland.

Janusz Kaczmarski: I happen to know that during the punch a letter in which President Walesa recognized President Yanayev had been written. I believe that it was authored by the president's immediate entourage. Walesa declared, "I am acquainted with Yanayev." So is my brother, who met him in the same place as Walesa, in Geneva, where Yanayev had represented Soviet workers. In Prague, during the meeting dissolving the Warsaw Pact, my brother Lech was standing in a hallway when Yanayev, then the head of the Russian delegation, stopped him, exclaiming, "Oh, Comrade Kaczmarski!"

Jack Merkl: Well-informed sources in the Belvedere tell me that Walesa had the letter to Yanayev all ready and was going to dispatch it when, at the last minute, Prime Minister Bielecki personally stopped him from doing so. Had that letter been dispatched, Walesa would have found himself in the company of Kadhafi, Saddam Hussein, and Tymoshuk.

Lech Kaczmarski: On 19 August, I learned of the decision to dispatch the letter to Yanayev. I do not know whose idea it was, the president's himself or Minister Wachowski's. This happened shortly after the publicity connected with the deletion of passages from Walesa's address to NATO in Brussels.

The Gray Eminence

Lech Kaczmarski: Initially two versions of the address existed, A and B. One was drafted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other enriched with passages inserted by the Presidential Chancellery. I held two meetings with Minister Skubiszewski at which we settled on the final, compromise version received by Walesa and transmitted to NATO by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While already in Brussels I learned that confusion reigned among the Polish delegation owing to the existence of both versions A and B. I argued that there was only one version, coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But people from Walesa's immediate entourage kept pretending that they did not understand what I was talking about. The point was raised three times, I kept repeating, "Version B does not exist." At the Belgian Government's residence for official guests Wachowski read version A and declared, "Such an anti-Russian provocation will not be tolerated." The next day I was to travel to the NATO site in the company of the president, but Wachowski, holding the text of the address in his hand, pushed his way inside the car ahead of me. It was then that I noticed that some lines were crossed out. Walesa delivered the address, which turned out to be abridged.

High official at the Chancellery: Minister Skubiszewski said that everybody was furious because the printed text of the speech which they received clearly differed from its verbal delivery. High NATO officials complained to us, claiming that they were suspected of having pressured us to delete anti-Soviet accents from the speech.

The passage omitted by Walesa was as follows: "But we cannot conceal the truth about Polish-USSR relations—"

Editors: There exist problems which cast a shadow on our cooperation. Despite our efforts and our flexible approach to the negotiations, the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Poland still has not been agreed upon. The USSR is proposing distant deadlines and a slow rate of withdrawal of these troops. Such a policy toward a sovereign Poland is unacceptable. We await a positive turning point which will be important to improving the security climate throughout the continent.

Jerry Milewski: I believe that Minister Wachowski was instructed by the president to delete this passage. I was not in Brussels during that visit, but I know Walesa enough to believe so. Besides, the printed text of the speech that was distributed to reporters did contain that passage, and hence the president was concerned not about deleting it but about assuaging its impact.

Lech Kaczyński: While in the Belweder, I was unable to shape the president's current defense policy but I still had enough clout to be able to prevent unfortunate ideas and appointments to the rank of general. Several days prior to 19 August, I had objected to the personnel shifts in the command of the special military services, because I sensed that the new commander would be somebody representing the invisible pathological cliques so adroitly promoted by Minister Wachowski. Once the putsch erupted I learned that precisely such an appointment had been made (this concerns Czesław Wawrzyniak—Editor). I believe that Minister Wachowski deliberately presented [to Walesa] for signing that letter of appointment at a moment when the president sensed the emergence of a threat [from the Moscow putsch].

When I entered the Chancellery last March, Walesa entrusted me with drafting proposals for personnel shifts in the armed forces, which was linked to the idea of having the Ministry of National Defense directed by a civilian. Milewski conducted on my behalf dozens of interviews with various higher army officers. I presented not—both structural and personnel—proposals to Walesa on about 20 June 1991. At about that time, Wachowski began to visit me and urge me to forget about the idea of a civilian minister of defense, saying that it was a visionary and infeasible idea. Likewise, Walesa began to clearly retreat from championing that idea. We had sharp disputes about it. I was resolved to submit my resignation. A compromise was reached: the minister was to be a civilian but the chief of staff, endowed with great powers, was to be a military man. The only meeting of the National Security Council to be held during my short term of office took place on 5 July and to then was held in a tranquil atmosphere.

Jaroslav Kaczyński: It can be readily imagined what would have happened had Yanayev emerged the victor. In practice, it would have meant loss of control over everything that might be important and decisive at such a time. As known, then communist contacts would have immediately regained their ancient power. Submitting to the influence of people like Admiral Kosiński or

would have led Walesa to the threshold of unacceptable decisions—unfortunately I am not at liberty to tell everything—decisions of a military nature, totally unorthodox military alliances which would basically strengthen not so much Poland's military standing as the standing of the army in Poland and other postcommunist countries, thereby creating a well-enclosed system which could be potentially always submissive to the central command in Moscow.

Banker's Poker

Jaroslav Kaczyński: Speaking of pathological cliques in the Belweder, mention should be made of Andrzej Kozarkiewicz, Wachowski's deputy secretary for economic affairs under the president. In the armpits of the three statesmen he clearly ranked at the bottom—after Wachowski and Drzewciński. In practice he acted as a kind of messenger boy. This Kozarkiewicz was a kind of wheeler and dealer. Sometimes even this resulted in comical situations as when, as part of his "friendship" with me, he would tell his clients as follows, "So the bank refused you a loan. Do you know why?" Because Kaczyński told it not to. But you know, this can be arranged, because in reality it is we who hold the upper hand here, not Kaczyński. Of course, all this was news to me, and I have never had any influence on any bank.

I do not understand what it was all about; all I knew was that bankers used to visit Wachowski. He made some kind of deal, and the recent appointment of Gromkiewicz-Waltz (as the director of the National Bank of Poland) proves this. They simply sent out all kinds of signals to the effect that the Presidential Chancellery is the place where various kinds of deals can be arranged. Does this indicate that some big and strange financial arrangement has been concluded there? Everything indicates that they are not doing it just for fun, but there is no proof.

Jack Merkel: Obviously there exist many much more suitable candidates for the post of chairman of the National Bank of Poland than Mrs. Gromkiewicz-Waltz. Krzysztof Bielecki, Leszek Bakciewicz, Marek Dąbrowski—they all have administrative experience and are economists. The first two are well known in the world of finance. They engaged in negotiations abroad, which, given the existing Polish foreign debt, is a highly essential qualification for the bank chairman. I assess the qualification of the new bank chairman as very low. She has a distinctive perception of the state's financial system through the prism of the need to combat scams rather than to guide this unusually sensitive system. She was personally the coauthor of the presidential veto of the rejection of her nomination.

It is not true that she is nonpartisan. She is the leader of Victoria, a political party whose main platform is to support Walesa and which won about 1,000 votes in the recent parliamentary elections.

Lech Kaczyński: The selection of Mrs. Waltz to direct the National Bank of Poland is part of the logic of the

politics of Minister Wachowicz. No one is questioning her qualifications as an expert on banking law, which are good enough for an adviser. She is a good expert, but that is not enough to manage a bank that employs 9,000 persons and oversees the entire financial system of the nation. I happen to know that she has already received instructions from the Sejm which have nothing in common with the bank's financial policy.

I fear that, given the mystical attitude of the new Mrs. Chajec toward the president, her administration of the bank will in practice consist in telephone calls to and from Minister Wachowicz and his references to "the will of the president." The "telephone rule" of work may end badly for the bank itself and for Mrs. Chajec herself, who has bravely declared that the president has an exceptional legal instinct. I do not deny that Wałęsa has a great political instinct, but as for his legal instincts, I do not see any, not even a modicum of it. In general, to him law is an incomprehensible phenomenon.

Jack Merkl: But it is the mechanism of political action which Wałęsa has been applying, effectively to be sure, that I find most disturbing. As a major tactician he accomplished an astonishing feat. He humiliated the Sejm and made of it a laughing stock by securing for himself the future possibility of appointing the prime minister in the same way as he appointed the chairperson of the National Bank of Poland—by submitting repeatedly the nomination of the same person required by the Sejm. Since there is a three-month time limit, the president has the power to either force his nominee on the unwilling Sejm or by virtue of the constitution, dissolve the Sejm. Now after his experience with Mrs. Wałęsa, Wałęsa knows that the Sejm is more likely to submit to his political design than to let itself be dissolved.

What Next?

Jack Merkl: At a recent meeting of the National Defense Committee the Polish defense doctrine was discussed. I heard that the president was reluctant to familiarize himself with it, and as to whether the discussion was substantive, let us not discuss it. I believe that in the long run Wałęsa will not succeed in distancing himself from the acceptance of responsibility, especially for mistakes in decisions, while at the same time attributing to himself the credit for right decisions. He has never kept it secret, saying, "On what you like, if you succeed, I get the medals, if you fail, it is your fault." He says the truth, that is how he feels and acts. But a president's job is primarily to take decisions and, what goes with it, to accept responsibility for them.

Jaroslav Kazymir: Wałęsa may be dangerous to the state, as demonstrated by his recent comments on the need to suspend democracy. I believe that this whole plan [the Sejm's] is nothing but a cynical influence on the state. Wałęsa would like to have great powers, and it may be that his rule will be long-lasting, though not

unlimited. I believe that Poles will be content of deciding on everything but keeping somewhat under watch him here.

High official at the Chancellery: Wałęsa repeated each week that he would head the disorganized security system (saying that he himself would march on the Sejm). He would like to head any agencies that would actually emerge, even if that were a ministry denying a return to socialism.

For the time being there is no reason to believe that Wałęsa will be able to form an alliance of government forces. He has a chance to survive as a weak president who does not obstruct anyone. He enjoys constitutional freedom and he can not ride to and deliver speeches. He will come if he keeps acting as he is doing now. — personally the Sejm and the prime minister, dissolving the political parties, changing legislatures, and setting up one state man after another (today the choice is Kaczyński; yesterday it was Maciejowski or Mazowiecki; tomorrow it could be Komorowski). In this way he is gaining no base of support for himself. He is certain to lose.

In a year perhaps he will submit to a referendum, despite the outcry of our underground, that the elites are waiting the day of war. Therefore he will ask the people if they want him. If he wins 50 percent of the vote, he will rule with the aid of those repression organs; if he wins less, say 40 percent, he will resign. That is a fairly probable alternative. No one will believe that a man like that will resign. But as for me, I think that he is even to contradict himself. He wants to rule, yet at the same time he wants to resign and, thus, to abdicate the responsibility for everything.

Jaroslav Kazymir: He could call for a referendum, although I do not think he will do that soon. I am not sure that will be a part of the movement now being left toward him by the opinion. On the other hand, that is a relative assessment, because while the polls do indeed make Wałęsa look bad, they make the Sejm look even worse. A confrontation between the Sejm and the president would not necessarily have led to the collapse of the Sejm.

But how long will the new president? As soon as I became head of the Chancellery, I told him that he was president, got together. The new constitution is not yet here and since it is clear it will arrive this year, it is very likely that once it is signed the term of office of the president will expire, or it may constitute a lengthy, complex interpretation from the legal point of view of the powers of the head of state, or say it may immediately become a power in the current president. I am then not going to predict anything until the new constitution appears.

Gary G. Goss: The Council had a plan to discuss among other things, when the French came to discuss "no" to a referendum. It is enough to show that the exercise of power alone will not be enough for the current leaders as a reflection.

Krzysztof Wyzanski Wyzanski is personally too weak to be a dictator. A dictator is someone who accumulates power and rules by the strength of his coalition and abilities. Wyzanski is incapable of working out a plan of action. He would not know how. He is too cautious. On the other hand, a "submissive dictatorship" is possible. That Wyzanski would need the assistance of some steady component of whom he would be total master, e.g., a submissive prime minister working with a qualified team of politicians. Then the slogans would be written through political or public life. Now is the time for work. Now is the time for order and consistency, for following a specific direction.

I have lost my confidence in Wyzanski to such an extent that I am beginning seriously to believe that he is manipulating his influence in the press in order to lead us in support. He is supporting old generals, communists, and the OZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] and he is the last argument in favor of the "common regime" in public life.

Grzegorz Garsinski Wyzanski will have a chance, if he supports the majority coalition and attempts to influence us as is allowed in other systems. The worst he could do would be to pursue his personal concerns within the government. If he steps aside from the coalition, sooner or later he will lose, and will forfeit his credibility as a political force in Poland.

(All of the above comments are paraphrased.)

...

(Rev. 9-4)

I Also Asked the Following Persons To Comment:

Secretary of State Mieczyslaw Wyzanski, chief of cabinet (chief of staff) to the president, Secretary of State

Andrzej Upiasowski, presidential press spokesman, Secretary of State Lech Paluchowski, who is responsible for legal matters at the Presidential Chancellery, and Minister of State Jacek Zaleski, the director of the Presidential Chancellery.

I kept telephoning the Chancellery office of Minister Wyzanski at average of three times daily for two weeks. Mr. Minister was always either out of office or busy or receiving someone, or his line was busy, or he was out of and the secretary did not know when he would be back. The secretary always claimed, "We'll call you back." She never called back. When asked who she answered, "Mr. Minister has not decided yet." Persevering.

As for Minister Upiasowski, after many attempts I finally reached him and we had the following conversation on the phone:

"Ma, can I'd be happy to grant you an interview at some time agreed upon. But I got out early whether I should talk with you, because of the way you got with it."

"Mr. Minister, well then, do you really want to meet with me?"

"You can put down a No."

As for Professor Lech Paluchowski, he requested an advance list of questions. After he received them, he declared, "I don't see any point in answering these questions. I am an assistant to the president and not an adviser. You cannot ask me for comments on the team."

Minister Jacek Zaleski, too, requested an advance list of questions. But an interview with him never came about owing to his multiple duties. I do not think it was a protest.

On Campaign Trail With President Iliescu

CLAUDIO B. BACCHINI, *Associate Editor, JPRS*
in Bucharest / May 6/7/92

[Article by Vladimir Ispires: "In the Footsteps of the Beloved Leader"]

[Trans] He may not yet have decided whether to be a candidate for another term of presidential "drudgery," but Mr. Ion Iliescu is taking long and vigorous electoral steps. He is taking the country's pulse. Like the deer departed, and in the country's newspapers for the famous proclamation of "Pacea la noi"—I mean the Vania [Vania]—where the CPN [Presidential National Unity] [control] character was 99.99 percent of the vote, on 21 May 1991—did better than even Ceausescu—at that point, I say to look like a fish in water. As clear as to have his eyes closed. And to make sure that he does not betray a socialist-communist tradition. Mr. Il. followed in the footsteps of his predecessor with the presidential airport. Then, he went to the Ploesti revolution-march station, whose reputation has not been very anywhere in the past 30 years, while the former CAP [agricultural production cooperatives] in Ploesti and surrounding (Iasi, Ploesti, Giurgiu, Drobeta, etc.) were among the most miserable in the country, at exhibition station that Ceausescu visited about three times and that was used two years ago managed to a former Securitate collaboration. He also went to Bistrita, Vaila, a big farm, a couple of factories, and gave two speeches in which, among other things, he commiserated with the Americans and with Mr. Bush. "What is there to us, we could not have been doing better? We're missing lack of (in least) diplomatic deflection. Mr. Il. smoothly attacked—nothing new under the sun—the economy. As a matter of fact, Mr. Iliescu smiled—did he have more with him?—constitutional momentum like England, the Netherlands, and Denmark, whose royal houses are related to ours, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Sweden, etc., etc., countries that, even Mr. Iliescu must not do admit, are among the most prosperous and democratic in Europe. But no, not Mr. Iliescu, where is there to the humanity or to results, he flew into a passion and kept talking about an "electoral system." As if the above-mentioned countries, and we could even exclude Japan with its emperor, had electoral systems? Is the president constitutionally forgetting to tell the increasingly few people who admit him (and for our lives we do not understand why?) that an electoral campaign ends there every four years that are crucial times, that the presidential term, published in an official Minister comes to 51 million and 60 million in and may be augmented without limit at the president's request.

Anyway, his speeches in Vaila and Bistrita sounded like some exaggerated claim of political-ideological education.

The series of electoral «camps» continues. In his there was no meeting. He seems to have been well advised. He «marched» how could he not?—Am I mean's and his "communist" from the times when this Communism was first

«communist» of the socialist party constitution. The Henry Mackenzie (Cristobal, where one has has already been turned into the 1 «camps» facilities for Sandu and «communist» goods of a Dutch firm (from that kingdom), as well as the Agricultural Institute and the Prefecture. He will also drop in on Ploesti, the "little red town" whose output is his former wife and PNR (Revolutionary Communist Party) member Secretary Nicolae Rugea, a close acquaintance of Mr. Iliescu, from his constitutional night. We are looking forward to other electoral actions.

Aspects of Political Situation in May Discussed

PNCD Extremely Poor

CLAUDIO B. BACCHINI, *Associate Editor, JPRS*
in Bucharest / May 6/7/92

[Interview with Adrian Marines, member of the National Christian Democratic Peasant Party (PNCD) by Claudio Bacchini in May on 6 April "Romanian National Unity Party through (This Far North) Town of Cluj"]

[Trans] Romanian human condition has given the political scene under first rule system. Among them is that of Adrian Marines, who continued to do that his condition in politics is rather democratic and ideological because personally, he has no ambitions. He does not expect big things for the time being, his way to run of the general election because he will have some friends to write "But what I want is to live in a free Romania, and I am struggling along that line. I also want to publish a few more books (here and abroad, to travel freely, and to live in dignified and comfortable conditions."

[Adventurous] What, in fact, is the significance of the Convention and of the participation of the opposition forces?

[Marines] The Democratic Nationalist Peasant was the first organization in the country to launch the principle of joining the opposition forces. That was the cause of the Convention idea, although absolute majority belongs to Mr. Coposu. I think that the Liberals were wrong in their calculations about joining the Convention and that there are re-evaluating themselves. I say that on the basis of the rather weak results of the Liberals achieved in the local elections, when they ran together with the Republican Party in Cluj and won only two elected seats. Such signs cannot be too encouraging. My view is that the PNL (National Liberal Party) seeks power first and considers reform a secondary goal whereas the Convention is first for fundamental reform of government structure, and considers power and political maneuvering a secondary goal. That was the meaning of the key worded. The need to prevent a united front against communism and neo-communism.

[Adventurous] What role did the UDRR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) play in the Convention and in the local elections?

[Marian:] The UCRP had separate lists for candidates, but I strongly supported Lăsa, the candidate of the Convention. That may even have cost Mr. Lăsa some thing, however. Mr. Lăsa was intensely attacked for having Hungarian relations that he did not really have. He was accused of having a Hungarian wife although she comes from Clujna, (Hungary) and that he wanted to open a Hungarian consulate in Cluj (which does not fall under the mayor's authority). Neither from a mayor have the authorities to open a Hungarian consulate in Cluj, as was mentioned to him, nor to redouble the facilities for Romanian and Hungarian children to learning some and opening others. Many advantages was taken of the highly influential TV show regarding some (un)popularity in our opinion) declarations made by Minister Lăsa. Far to the effect that the Hungarian government viewed itself as the defender of communists living outside Hungary. Language restrictions, they said. That was interpreted also as interference in Romania's internal affairs.

[Adamescu:] Do you believe that it is natural and useful that UCRP continue as a member of the Convention from its Northern Transylvania? Some say that its membership is merely Romanian voters, because people vote along ethnic lines.

[Marian:] For reasons of ideological and democratic consistency, we do not see why we should not continue to cooperate with the UCRP. I have reason to believe in their loyalty. They have proved it, as a democratic, I cannot approve of discrimination. Personally, as my own mind, I am behind such ethnic discrimination. I believe in the idea of citizens with equal rights, regardless of ethnic origin.

[Adamescu:] I do so, but what is the situation in Cluj?

[Marian:] Indeed, in Cluj not everyone thinks as I do. I admit that, in terms of percentages, the ethnic polarization is still considerable, especially among the older and older generations, who still have traumatic memories from the time of the Hungarian occupation. The youth is much more indifferent to politics and to such discriminations. Both the Hungarians and the Romanians could live along each other, during the War, the post-war, and so forth. Another form of involvement in politics is that I am an editor of the newspaper TRIBUNA CLUJANĂ. We are accused of being the Hungarian mouthpiece, even of having been bought by the Hungarians, which is not true. I have a completely independent newspaper. But we are as open as possible. We have published Hungarian authors, too, and that is one thing for which we are being criticised, even by Mr. Păcur. The present mayor who are Hungarians contributing to our newspaper? Well, why not? Since they are Romanian citizens, they have a right to express themselves.

[Adamescu:] Do you think that PNL (Romanian National Unity Party) nationalist propaganda in Cluj will be effective in the coming elections, too?

[Marian:] Nationalist propaganda appeals to a certain category of people. You see, Cluj has changed both its

social and ethnic composition in the wake of the arrival of thousands of refugees in town in the post-war years. Formerly urbanized, they had some of the country's ethnic minorities. This primarily Romanian urbanization is urban and many is concentrated in Mureș and Maros-Bihar County in the newspaper's circulation by districts and communities. There were even districts for the PNL voters.

[Adamescu:] To return the matter to the winning Mr. Lăsa, a PNL (Romanian) candidate for the Democratic Union of the Army (effort) something that could not itself to Romanian newspapers in the UCRP (Romanian Convention) candidate for the mayor of Cluj was not a very good idea.

[Marian:] It was a mistake, I certainly was not doing in the Păcur's. I was the director of the paper. But Mr. Lăsa did not. I agreed with the voting system and the last moment. But then there was the TV broadcast, in addition to which he came under strong attack by a certain military officer. Mr. Lăsa was a man who led in this political struggle, but he was not made a comeback as a Party candidate for the Mayor or the Chamber of Deputies.

[Adamescu:] Arguably, the historical parties did not do very well in governing the village. What is your view?

[Marian:] True. The major problem was poor communication. There is a shortage of means of transportation, neither a newspaper, and the party gave a quality to get across. For example, PNL (National Christian Democratic Peasant Party) has three county branches. This does not exist in the county. There could have been more, but the PNL is an extremely poor party. If there is one poor party in Romania, which did not take one dollar (as published) from anyone, it is the PNL. It runs its newspapers, broadcasts, publishing, materials and everything else with the money it does not have.

[Adamescu:] The approach is that it did not sufficiently "mobilize" itself.

[Marian:] The approach was very correct, but only until the last congress. After the congress the party up brought 40 congress and a few candidate members of the Young Convention are in their 10's (Socialist Workers' Union) types.

[Adamescu:] The PNL was also criticised for having accepted Securitate members from the beginning.

[Marian:] I think that a week later was the resignation of some party members, which immediately after the revolution accepted a group of former Foreign Ministry officials. But they were chased in the next congress. They are no longer there. The membership was not cut during these two years.

[Interviewer] It is also being said that the PSD/CJ's subordination is due to Mr. Ciogea and that without Mr. Ciogea the party

[Marcel] He is obviously a personification of the first rule. He was the first politician in today's Romania.

[Interviewer] On one thing that the PUNB was especially created to draw water of your party's doctrine?

[Marcel] PUNB followed an exclusively national line. The PSD/CJ, however, evolved toward a Christian democratic party, and that may be its true future. This is a new reality being that compared to other Europe. The PSD/CJ was accepted with full rights into the European Christian Democratic Union. The PUNB will continue to play the ethnic card of the Hungarian party. It is a purely ethnic party, without a doctrine.

[Interviewer] What are the economic rights movements in Romania?

[Marcel] Is the economic right may be included Marian Watanescu's Movement for Romania. I have seen a very strange publication, *GAZETA DE ASEM*. That is the motto: "Being a legislator [ironic] is important, but we are paying for being anti-legislators." So long as such questions will continue to be made in Romania, you realize that the economic right has begun to go in that direction. That makes us a very responsible center party.

[Interviewer] How do you define the PUNB?

[Marcel] I view it as a party of local importance. The PUNB will certainly not succeed throughout the country with the idea of a Hungarian party. Its impact is greater in the region that had been relinquished. These things will gradually erode because we cannot possibly believe in Hungarian aggression. Look, we are the Romanian domain here, the majority domain. The Hungarians probably have their own minority economic groups, but as there is a Romanian Man, why should there not be a Hungarian? I mean of Greater Hungary? Such phenomena are caused by a historical factor, ancient traditions, and I think lack of substantial progress of the spirit of democracy. As soon as you shift your attention on the crime, with its rights and duties, rather than on ethnic origin, color standards change. But democracy even now is not very advanced in Romania. Such undesirable situations will continue to exist as long as the focus is on ethnicity, on a closed, uniform team, on fundamentalist orthodoxy, and on the exclusion of certain religions. For example, in Cluj, the Unitarian Church has for two years held its services in the open. I used to have five churches in Cluj, but last year one was removed to 1. The conflict is not between the Unitarian Church and the Orthodox Church, but between the Unitarian Church and the communist state that confiscated its properties. This is a matter of giving back property. The Orthodox Church gave back churches in Timisoara and Lugoj thanks to the wisdom, political sense, and broad sense of democracy of Bishop Cosma, a true scholar.

[Interviewer] There is the presence of a new movement being felt in Cluj?

[Marcel] It is not felt at all. What is felt is an escalation in Mr. Pagar's threats and attacks against not only the independent press (*TRIMBUNA CLUJULUI*), but especially on grounds that we are publishing Hungarian authors, but also against the CDRH, which is accused of housing its headquarters in a 12-story building (which is not true). He also threatened to rush forth from the building and take measures against illegal signs. He has a what the PSD/B and its new paper have brought in Cluj: a new atmosphere, even if at present it is still only verbal. Words, however, tend to spread and to create and heighten tension.

How PUNB Was Formed

[Marcel] Interview: "The Romanian" - May 1982, p. 41.

[Interview with Ion Watanescu, editor of *TRIMBUNA CLUJULUI*, by Gabriela Radulescu in Cluj on 4 April. "Interview (Participated in the Vote for the Romanian National Union Party in Cluj)."

[Ion] [Interviewer] Is it already felt that Cluj has a new flavor and that it belongs to the PUNB [Romanian National Union Party]?

[Watanescu] Yes. There are two aspects to this new spirit: including, to be as I know, the new paper took drastic measures to reorganize and run through efforts. The negative aspect is that, in a bid to confirm its election program, it has sent a notification to Hungarian schools and churches in Cluj requesting that they remove Hungarian writing from the signs of these institutions.

[Interviewer] Do you know anything about the fact that the Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church are in the Watanescu Council?

[Watanescu] What was surprising was that the head of the Greek Catholic Church of Cluj, Mr. Langa, appeared on the list of potential county councilors. Surprisingly, he agreed to run as an independent in the PUNB list. As far as I know, Mr. Pagar was very content and apparently Father Langa finally let himself be persuaded. In the end he regretted his action, but did not do anything about it.

[Interviewer] How do you explain the fact that the PUNB won the election in Cluj?

[Marcel] The PSD [National Salvation Front] realized that it was going to lose. In the second round, the PSD, which had conducted a brutal propaganda against the PUNB, attacking it almost as strongly as the CD [Democratic Convention], did a complete turnaround. But an PSD-PUNB alliance was not enough and the last card had not yet been played. The outcome was decided when the television station went, with a very great and very well-planned delay, that unfortunate statement by the Hungarian prime minister. The day before the second round of elections the two were in the courtyard.

[Admiral] So Mr. Adrian Nastase, too, contributed to the P.N.R.'s victory?

[Marian] Yes, unfortunately. The document was signed by 1,000 voters. The deficit of the C.D. was that, but a 67.5 percent vote in an election does not make one a traitor. If any crime, it was an honorable one.

[Admiral] Was the P.N.R. campaign aggressive?

[Marian] Its propaganda was good. It took advantage of national feelings, of those the people of Cluj harbor about a so-called Hungarian threat, and of reactions left by the old Hungarian occupation of Northern Transylvania. In my view, the P.N.R. administration emerged from a "shadowy" area that led to General Kucera's intervention in the electoral campaign. The Kucera-Licu conflict began with some rather harsh exchanges, but the standard was Gen. Kucera, who had a bad record during back in December 1988, when, before the Cluj labor meeting, he threatened to open fire on the crowd. To see Gen. Kucera so uncharacteristically concerned about intervening in areas and directions in which the army has no business, namely in politics. We heard a strange announcement for the P.N.R. and P.N. to be as we know that did not happen, circumstances in which the current mayor belongs?

[Admiral] So, who voted for the P.N.R. People with a secondary education, like the current mayor?

[Marian] Old Cluj voted for the Communists. The bad area was typed in favor of the P.N.R. to the new districts (Marasti, Mures) from, too, we can speculate about lack of political awareness and education. People here are more impressionable and the effect, in turn, of the Hungarian threat's statement, will reflected by the P.N.R. played a decisive role. During the first round of elections, abstention was very high (60%), when some came of Hungarian voting (head of Sala Wren and where thousands of people from Marasti, who had not attended to vote, went off to vote. After all, voting is a civic action. Then, however, voted under the impression of a report that in the end turned out to have been false. The statement was broad cast on television, so television was involved in the voting in Cluj.

[Admiral] How did the alliance with the U.D.M. (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) fit in the election?

[Marian] The alliance with the U.D.M. was right. If there were no alliance, they had to do with an insufficient willingness to negotiate on the part of the U.D.M. Of course, everyone knew that if you went with the U.D.M. you stood to lose some support, but you could win in another place, in another area. Both the Communists and the U.D.M. made mistakes. In one point the agreement was created that the U.D.M. had prior talks with the

C.D. more for consultation. That was an advertising mistake, which has since been exploited by the opposition press. But it is worth noting to begin to speculate in an electoral campaign.

[Admiral] In what point is there agreement in the C.D. and the U.D.M. running together?

[Marian] The objectives are the same. The Hungarians did not have a candidate for mayor, having uncharacteristically supported the C.D. candidate. They asked to be supported in the places where they had both candidates and not elections. It seems that they were supported, but not in the same extent as they supported the Communists. They went from to the point of making mistakes and losing votes. Cluj of course they voted extraordinarily for two months, thus obtaining a few thousand ballots. Well, it is hard enough to efface a profile.

[Admiral] You have a complicated strategy for running together.

[Marian] Yes, it is very complicated and it will become even more so because of the liberal party. The U.D.M. has a big advantage, considering the number of Hungarians in the region, while for us it is difficult according to C.D. parties is very difficult. No one knows how many people voted for the P.N. (I see Alliance Party), how many for the U.D.M., and how many for the Peasant Party. We know how many voted for the Communists, how many for the P.N.R., the U.D.M., and the P.N. Another point of information we have is that in several areas the P.N. were alone and won 700 votes for the entire county, which was a catastrophe. Once again the Communists appeared as a better politician.

[Admiral] If you had the power to set the dates for the elections, when would they be held?

[Marian] In June. The general election should be held separately from the presidential. I think that the C.D. people will be better and more conscious, and that the means for Parliament will be entirely different from the means in the local elections. I hope that the national factor will take a secondary place thanks to the candidates featured on the lists.

[Admiral] What is the P.N. situation in Cluj?

[Marian] One of the German cases in Cluj was that of Ion Avram Sereca. He was Sereca's right hand in the U.D.C. (Union of Construction Youth), where Sereca was Minister of youth and sports general of the U.D.C. On 2 December he was at the Cluj House Museum / exhibition, where he had been sent by the party youth commission. He stayed locked up in there with Mihai Potroaga, the future mayor of Cluj, who repeatedly tried to keep the workers from leaving the conditions. Not only in the conditions, but also in the street with militia and Securitate men. On the 22d, after the great demonstration, the headquarters of the youth party commission was occupied. A few days later, I. A. Sereca was called back to show people how a worker worked (he had been

responsible for the economic sector and to solve the system. Within one week he was nominated as Bucharest, apparently by himself. Soon then his role has been confirmed and strengthened. But then he wandered over to the Marxist wing. Locally, the PNR is represented by Professor Gregory Zait, a former professor of Marxism at the university, who represents the Marxist wing, a Partner for Romania.

Romanian Schools Translated

ALBANY: Bucharest. 27 in Romanian / 1 May 80 / 14

(Interview with Gabor Adamian, member of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by Gabriela Adamianescu in Cluj on 3 April. "A Strange Familiar Face in the Time of the Dictatorship")

(Time) Is it already being felt that Cluj has a new mayor who belongs to the PUNR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania)?

(Adamian) It is felt in certain decisions that were in fact not made decisions, but his personal decisions, a kind of leadership by decree.

(Adamianescu) Are there any Hungarian-language schools, or not? Mayor Faur said that there are only Romanian schools that are also attended by Hungarians.

(Adamian) That, in fact, is how some people view it, namely that the Education Law of the government had that requires each system had out evening schools in which the teaching language is Hungarian. But such schools do exist in the Banat, Crișana, and other counties. Last summer there was a scandal in Cluj about such schools and there will probably be another one after the break. Cluj has two high schools in which the teaching language is Hungarian, although they have Romanian teachers, too, and some subjects (history, geography) are taught in Romanian. The Constitution guarantees the right to be educated in the Hungarian language. There is no education left on, as these high schools operate without strictly legal grounds for existing. In fact, it is not exactly clear who is responsible for the organization of these high schools. If they are subordinated to the Education Ministry, then the local authorities have no right to interfere in the matter. If they are a part of the local autonomy of the region or of the respective locality, then indeed the mayor has a right to make decisions on the matter. The problems are very complex, because the government is making decisions regarding the high schools, which are implemented through the Education Ministry. However, that the buildings in which these high schools are located are not by the local public administration, and the mayor says that he does not have sufficient space to allow such students to study in his mother tongue. This was so, in fact, even when at the internal management of each high school, including the Hungarian ones. Thus, under the pretext that he has to guarantee the students' education in the

Romanian language, he means to introduce Romanian-language classes in the buildings of the Hungarian-language high schools. In fact he wants to convert the old centers of mixed high schools, but under the dictatorship he means to use this strategy as first Romanian (the institution and then even education in the Hungarian or any other) language.

(Adamianescu) Is that why, to a minority Hungarian sign?

(Adamian) Precisely. The sign shows that in the building is located an institution that teaches in the Hungarian language. By removing the sign and giving the school just a number, all the schools are made equal and placed under his jurisdiction. The method is familiar from the time of the dictatorship. The "sign" phenomenon shows that these moves are precisely the strategy and in fact the people that used it during the dictatorship for their purposes.

Notes on CD-4 DMR Relations

ALBANY: Bucharest. 27 in Romanian / 1 May 80 / 14

(Interview with Gabor Adamian, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania leader, by Gabriela Adamianescu in Cluj on 3 April. "We Will Support New Democratic Coalition")

(Time) Gabor Adamian is also one of the figures that represent Romanian Communism has contributed to Romanian politics. He is also subject to the call of Communism, always in relation to the disagreements referred to the political life especially ours.

(Adamianescu) What can you tell us about the experience of the local elections?

(Adamian) The utmost attention contribution is that the other side has replaced the political view in Timisoara (or in Northern Transylvania). The question is whether a different strategy or different principles of cooperation (or accommodation) would have yielded better results for the democracy. There are certain non-adequacies according to which even if we had negative examples (in the sense that the democracy could not come to expression, or we were not able to help personal democracy become real democracy), nevertheless the overall balance of the cooperation was very positive. I think that this is something beyond. What is not done but still exists in some regions (only as an unpleasant detail, I hope) is that sometimes, in certain places, our voters get the impression that their participation was only superficial, meaning in words only. What specifically, our votes were sought, but at times we had the impression that the vote was not equally true for our candidates and our participation. We had candidates on the Convention lists, but I was referring to cases in which approximately 40 percent of a city's population was ethnically Hungarian, but our candidate was not accepted on the grounds that the Romanian democracy

will not vote for a Hungarian leader if the Hungarians in question had the official support of the C.D. (Democratic Convention). That is in fact what occurred in Cluj-Napoca. However, we think that the convergence was fruitful and that it is the only possibility. Still, if someone should change because of our participation, we can select another strategy, one of completely separate candidates. We will definitely support any democratic coalition, even if we do not participate in the government. Our agreement stands without regard as to who will be the Convention's candidate for the Presidency; we will support him (named) agreement provided it is not the Communists.

[Ademecaru:] Do you still intend to abandon politics?

[Nucsu:] It is both a matter of logic and diplomacy. After being imprisoned and repressed, I was presented to the Romanian public as an innocent and a character, autonomous, which I am not. Unfortunately because I am a poet, once a possible bridge between the two cultures was also compromised. Because the work of artists is one means of rapprochement between two ethnic communities, between two nations. Unfortunately, my work, which could have served the purpose of such rapprochement, was for a while compromised because I am no longer viewed as a poet, but as a character. Thus in view of the situation, it was to make even for the U.D.M.R. (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) if, at this time, its leader is not anymore viewed as an extremist. Of course, in three or four months the new U.D.M.R. leadership will also be described as such, as being extremist. But perhaps enough time will have passed until then for the Romanian society to understand that a U.D.M.R. leader is not necessarily a character or an extremist.

[Ademecaru:] Do you think that radical sector of your declarations were slightly ambiguous?

[Nucsu:] No, they certainly were not. But whatever I said, they were interpreted from emotions and understanding, regardless of what I said. For example, once I said something about eastern Hungary. My statement was immediately interpreted to mean that I was talking about Transylvania. Eastern Hungary is a very frequently used word for the eastern parts of Hungary. Nevertheless, it seemed obvious that my statement was interpreted to mean that "there is referring to Transylvania as Eastern Hungary." There are thousands of such examples. I was never ambiguous or confusing. And in fact, I think this can be demonstrated if we analyze all my public speeches, interviews, or declarations. Recently I was in Nordmeyer, where I talked about the political situation in Romania and about our situation, and once again I was presented as an extremist who was poisoning the good relations between the two nationalities. I suggest that the text be published and analyzed.

[Ademecaru:] What will the U.D.M.R. look like if you and Mr. Corn Ciomachea go up as leadership positions?

[Nucsu:] I want to continue to write wherever I can, but for that I do not have to hold a leadership position. If I have any influence and privilege, I will have them even without any post. We hope to be able to create a new structure capable of operating on the basis of a new principle. We may not have very powerful personalities in the new Union, but perhaps this Union will be more openable for management leaders, technicians who will be able to cooperate among themselves. But if there will be a need for politicians, so to speak, for government personalities, or if my presence will be viewed as absolutely necessary, in one or two years, or whenever I will perhaps reconsider, attracted by the political experience for me, I allowed myself to be named. Because as a matter of fact I never had such political ambitions.

Criticism of New Romanian-Led Party Accepted

A. BUDAPESZT. Budapesti Hírlap, cited in Romanian Press, 4/2/92

Interview with economist Doru Brana by Constantin Brana and Adrian Botocan. Place and date not given. "Nationalism and United Europe"

[Text] (Budapest Hírlap.) Mr. Brana, you are back in Romania after traveling during a period of agitation, before the elections. How do you see the current political scene, the new parties that have arisen such as the Movement for Romania?

[Brana:] Yes, political confusion unfortunately continues in Romania. I am surprised to see that one of the promoters of this confusion is a man who, if we are to trust logic and common sense, should be the first to realize how important it is especially now, to establish a stability of political fronts in Romania. The emergence of new political organizations indicates that the 23 million concerned with a Romania have not yet been satisfied, a phenomenon which I considered normal until one and a half years ago, but now I wonder with these people do not try to put the already existing parties. Using their political skill and talent, let them create a majority in the political party they prefer and propose the political line they consider appropriate. It seems to me that it would be time of the Municipal Court with the registration of new parties, is a waste of public funds in a country in which I am ashamed to see children are starving. However, the Movement for Romania has drawn my attention among the newly emerging parties, and I could say that I have now come to Romania because I consider the creation of this political organization as a signal, a signal equal unfortunately, which has also been perceived in the West and which contributes absolutely nothing to the accomplishment of Romania's general mission of reuniting Europe. Why do I see this? Because on a continent which is definitely heading toward the formation of the United States of Europe, an movement already has a chance, particularly if it governed by economists. Marian Văduțanu would

probably engaged in saying that we are experiencing a rebirth of national movements in Europe, and on the surface, that is so.

[BALK: A/DK] It might be useful to have a few details about the national movements here and abroad.

[BALK: I/DK] If you just look at the surface, obviously I should say I'm right, but some questions will show that the pressures for the national movements that are currently under pressure in Europe are entirely different from the nationalists. I thought was critical, that we have tried in Romania, in which the Movement for Romania after various feelings. What is that difference? Whereas these national movements in West Europe are motivated by a normal response of emigrants from throughout the world, in Romania, the overwhelming effect of nationalism leads only to an attitude against potential emigrants who will do not come, and thus against those outside Romania. The national movements in West Europe are in fact a technical effect of manpower distribution. Let me be more explicit. The number of emigrants that are allowed to enter into West European countries is apportioned in a function of the percentages achieved by these national parties, but continuous amount of work is presently needed following the entry of the former GDR into the Common Market, the plans to develop southern Italy, Portugal, southern Spain, Greece, and so on. These are development projects that have been underway for decades, which can now be implemented, and which now require an immense amount of labor. Western politicians of course realize that they must make a wise use of manpower in controlling the situation, and thus induce these national movements to let the pulse of the population. The moment these movements obtain 15 percent, they immediately reduce the number of emigrants, and as I have noticed for several years, the electoral percentages achieved by these parties drop to about 1, 4, or 5 percent, which is insignificant. At the same time at the same time, a new organization, which we can see is rather unimpressive, wants to get substantial percentages at the next election using arguments which at the moment are outdated for 1992, in light of the enormous progress of the entire region of Europe.

[BALK: A/DK] Mattarone said that he was strongly counting on the discontented youth whose numbers could reach nearly 3 million, many of whom had not even come forward at the last elections.

[BALK: I/DK] If I were Mattarone, I would avoid having the realization of a political program on a multitude of discontented people. The trick is with one thing: the procedural substitution of the political process that the specific organization wants to impose. What is more, given Mattarone's stand, I believe he should have expected that members of political organizations that have already found a conceptual niche would be much more efficient. I think that the identification with PNCD [National Front Christian Democratic Party] claimed by Mattarone is evidence of the urgent problems that will affect the Movement for Romania, in which case he

has certainly achieved the necessary political or through that statement. Whether it was to the advantage of the Movement for Romania remains to be seen, but I certainly was in the disadvantage of the PNCD. I don't know how delighted PNCD members were to hear that they are allied with a political movement which at once according to Mattarone's statements, is ideologically correct in beliefs situated in the beginning of the century. I have heard statements regarding your suggestion of otherwise with Mattarone, an otherwise that almost certainly the position of the Movement for Romania. We are dealing with an organization that we should carefully avoid, to bring to a just a full capacity of demonstrating organizational inferiority and other things. A French statement, it seems that something is superficial. Let's not even talk about Mattarone's statements, which in the opinion are completely irrelevant in assessing the present condition of the Romanian nation. Just look at the findings of the otherwise. The one who was almost identical "Social democracy is not compatible with the Romanian nation." For he is from the so-called left, so to change Mattarone's political opinions, but the movement one wants to conduct political action in a democratic society, it is incompatible to have. Because that a political division is inappropriate. I would not permit myself to contradict the political conviction of even one person in 20 million, if a single person is a convinced social democrat. I think that social democracy is compatible with the Romanian nation. I am not a social democrat. I don't fully share that ideology, but as I appear to be a pluralist, I believe that I would advocate the own democratic beliefs. But I would consider a disadvantage.

[BALK: A/DK] You have not covered any party and therefore have not expressed any political choice, suggesting an independent attitude.

[BALK: I/DK] I wouldn't have expressed a political opinion on 20 May, but as someone who had climbed up the ladder on the strength of his confidence in plain sight of another politician the first thing I do is a Romanian citizen in the first election that was freely held in Romania and. The truth the first about what came over me, and perhaps thinking that I would see that a Romania promised the first being a Romania, but to go on with Mattarone. There is no other national doctrine than I discovered. Christianity is an individual spiritual matter. The movement is a need to organize a multitude of people in Mattarone's probably would like to do. These Christians change from gentle to dangerous. Let us no longer gather in God's name in fundamental organizations, let us give each person the prerogative to see God according to his nature, his thoughts, and his reasons. I was shocked by another of Mattarone's statements, when he said that the Legionnaires were a Romanian society over the country supported them. I will show Mattarone's attention to the fact that since 1988, except for a single person, a unit, an entire nation also supported Nicolae Ceausescu. I would therefore ask Mattarone whether something that I consider did was also Romanian?

Ecologist Party Dealings, Leadership Under Fire

ANASTASIE DUCAREL, *Ecologist Party*, 1991 in Romania
= 11 May 92, 1

Editorial by Vlad Miron: "The Ecologist Movement Party Issue"

[Text: The MPR (Romanian Ecologist Movement) Congress opened on Sunday 1 May 1992. We all remember the enthusiasm that the news of its founding aroused right after the revolution. But what is left now, more than two years later, of the first enthusiasm of that date? The great issue that defines the movement's role was in the past of establishing an ecologist movement in the country that Mr. Ceaușescu wanted to destroy in Romania, while the MPR's motto should be revised to "We Ecologists in a Free Country in a Free World!"

The current was still at war when Tonia George Mironescu started the appeal to found the movement. People of all ages, attracted to the mottoes of the slogan "A Clean World is a Clean Country, or a Clean World," began to send in their support. The first meeting was held in Iulian Hall, one which over 1,000 people crowded including Dănilă Ciomara, a professor at the Pedagogical Institute, the stage manager Sorana Cornelia Stancu, Dr. Alexandru Simion, the composer Elena Petrescu, the poetess Mariana Burtu and Sorana Rădulescu, one president of the Association of Youth & Ecological Movement contribution was closed with Tonia George Mironescu in character. But at back of them was the enthusiasm of some youth who found their job, some of them even becoming motivated by volunteering for the MPR. Names like C. Vănturaru, M. Căpăruș, I. Tălcășanu will not be found at the MPR Congress, but without their willing support the results on 27 May 1992 would have been entirely different, and ecologists like Dănilă Ciomara would have held themselves completely in character. The departure of these young volunteers, who have the whole burden and with the "clean" ones to Parliament began right after the election, in a clean game like that the youth are always confident. To what further good should the party (Mironescu) do such (Alexandru Simion) and the Ecologist Movement have used them?

The results in final battle were not the design one of some ambitious youth. The main point was that in ecological distribution with the Urmasii, coming later with the new generation out of long experience, had the reward was not long in coming. The building at Iulian Hall, the former headquarters of the P.C. (Romanian Communist Party), addition of about 1 million by out of many funds, a clean station wagon with a few million (at 100) in which Dănilă Ciomara (in published) only one. The ecologist publication (EC) was founded in the same period, and although King Mironescu, who became the manager, now had a source of income for his month ahead. EC did not last very long under his management, although it started out under the previous manager of a man from Mironescu Party. While

I have also mentioned the first headquarters, let us not forget a "detail" namely that it was turned over to the MPR with no complete freedom, including, the party's property Mr. Simion Palatin, then vice president of the movement, took care to make himself use of them for himself. When the affair began to stir, the ecologist movement took care to acquire a relationship to the United States offering by the GDS (Group for Social Dialogue) which came in the name of Paul Vănturaru, a journalist on the EC) as the owner. As we all very well know the United States is an attractive country, so that it is no wonder that the blackmaster Palatin required political asylum. He is being today in a clean country in a clean world.

Those who stayed in Romania began to concern themselves with management "clean" matters. The ad that came from France and was distributed through the MPR to the children's life and in other ways to be sold in the open market. The Ecologist Party thought to help in distribution in Romania and with them came other engagements. Through the personal management of Ioan Tălcășanu, the economic manager of the MPR, it reached the Ecologist Movement, the source of Mr. Ciomara's efforts.

I love Romania, a being possessed. Since the ecologist and Romanians are, who would Mr. Sorana Rădulescu who arrived in the last president, not be possessed in self? While on an ecological trip through France, he registered the IM (International Marketing) NISSE (International NISSE) to connect Iulian Ciomara, Sorana Rădulescu goods are needed and the money must be collected in France. Rădulescu's wife registered a firm of the name of Romania. What business was IM NISSE in? Social ecological affairs. The country did not have any, but the "Romanian" (black) ones used it for in illegal manipulation from that was called "the" because of a wide European exposure. The secretary of the firm is a young Dănilă Ciomara, a friend of the Ministry of Interior was another one of its business. And then, coming of the Mr. Tălcășanu founded the "League of Romanian Ecologist Friendship" through which he was able to obtain a subsidy of 1,500,000 from Iulian. Mr. Mironescu did not agree to the offer and suspended it. The responsibility for its refusal was also "ecological." There was no further plan for blocking national strategy programs in the last European states.

The youth-state that came and hangs in the MPR is composed of Tonia George Mironescu, whose last name is Tonia Miron, a graduate of the ecological Mironescu University in Mironescu. Dănilă Ciomara, who was arrested after the revolution by his former students at TCM and Ioan Tălcășanu, former organizer of the party, secretary of the C.C. of the U.T. (Central Committee of the Union of Communist Youth).

We will begin with the latter, who discreetly appeared at the MPR in 1991 as an economic administrator. Along with Ciomara he was the promoter of the affiliation with the P.N.S. (National Socialist Party, Ecologist) in

becoming undersecretary of state in the former Ministry of Public Administration. He would also have liked to be mayor of Bucharest. With no higher education, he became a consultant in sector 1 supported by the Front, which office he obtained by falsifying public documents, declaring on his candidate's card that he is an engineer. He was nevertheless given an executive director of MEIR and delegate in relations with COMPIRES. He represents the movement in discussions with the government and in contacts with foreign delegations. Although he did not and does not have any kind of mandate to represent the Executive Managing Committee, he was the representative of the MEIR in the intelligence courses of the Council for Defense of Romania, which are given at the Military Academy. As a grass dignitary of the movement, he controls correspondence, arranges trips abroad and in perfect Securitate style, has all telephone numbers from Trianon has two passports, one Romanian and one Israeli. Where does he actually represent?

In any case, he has represented Toma George Maresescu when he obtained a visa for him at St. Katerina Street, opposite the entrance of the zone where he studied (U.M.B.). He probably learned about the market economy at those Maresescu courses, and now he is managing a foreign trade firm jointly with a French citizen of Romanian origin (Platon). You can buy your perfumes, cosmetics and wines, all ecological at the Chis mere on Maghera Boulevard.

But the big ecological business belongs to Doina Dinter with his private autonomy. He conducts his activity today in over 20 offices in Bucharest and has a part of the MEIR's headquarters, to the east the Maresescu-Dinter team operated perfectly, the latter promising financial aid for the newspaper ECO and for MEIR. Instead of that, the Ecological University recruited officers through the movement's influence and technical equipment out of the donations for the MEIR. When Sorin Racoveanu proposed in the Managing Committee that the university become a joint-stock company with the majority held by the MEIR, Mr. Dinter jumped as if burned. "Was such a thing possible?" Should he use his so profitable puppet (an annual turnover of more than 60 million lei, without bothering to count the collections of foreign exchange from the foreign students)? Mr. Dinter's promises are still unknown, and he even owns the movement's money today.

But the ecological crusade went on. Without the approval of the Executive Managing Committee, Dinter constituted himself as undersecretary of state in the National Committee on Controlling Waters. The mission was an "environmental" as it was in the case of the Ecological University. & for he could be obtained if this committee agreed to the founding of a plant to burn wastes brought in from the West. What could be more laudable on the part of an ecological leader than the noble intention of importing refuse "in a clean country, in a clean world"? It was not to be, but we do not think Mr. Dinter is discouraged. Braustfield wastes did not work, but he can still try to import bones or plasterboard,

both of which products will make the ecological grow more grow on the campus of Dinter University.

We have every respect for Mr. Marinus Blatu, but we cannot overlook a number of troubling questions. Since he became head of the Ministry of Environment, we would have expected to see better results. What has he done so far? He does not seem to care that the law on environmental protection has not been approved. He is not concerned that the country should learn the degree of pollution of households or the truth about the destruction of its forests. Unfortunately, Mr. Blatu has sparked in silence. The word is going to the West, that is to Hungary, Austria, or Germany, and what does it matter that the Romanians will no longer have forests? What has Mr. Blatu done for the Danube Delta, Delta of Copca Mica? Vice president of the MEIR, a senator, a minister and dean of the Faculty of Natural Sciences at the Ecological University. It seems to be getting close to the Presidency of the country. Once he became a minister, Mr. Blatu did not shrink from going up his post as a senator, and as a result the MEIR is no longer represented in the highest forum in the land.

The firm Tescom, sponsored by Ion Trian, and managed by his partner, one Robert, is another peak in ecology in Romania. The object of its activity is the sale of Romanian venison, specially processed on Comanescu's former reservations. The representatives of the firm boast of their highly placed connections, to the point of maintaining that they facilitated the installation of an international telephone in the office of Minister Marinus Blatu, who could have blocked the contracts of that firm that were disadvantageous to the country.

There would be just as much to say about the other ecologists, but we do not want to repeat ourselves. Is there any point in dwelling on Mr. George Scartureanu, who was in the presidency of the congress on its second day in operation? He is just small fry in comparison with Adolf Dinter. He only founded the Carpathian Ecological Society, thus violating Article 2 of the MEIR's charter, which sanctions "persons who would try to accomplish their personal aims through the internal affairs of it."

Alexandru Roma is a scientist and he is trying a position, as proved by the way Dinter used him to obtain official recognition of the Ecological University from the Ministry of Education (which he is a secretary of state in that institution).

Mrs. Virginia Cosmina Vasilev cannot agree with the firm in the MEIR, being in the same position as Mr. Vahingiu, that is well understood but powerless against the Maresescu-Blatu team. Mr. Octavian Costin is supported only by a limited group, although he fights for the advancement of the MEIR. He does not seem to have any political future, since his activity in the branch has always qualified according to the word was Ministry on the Managing Committee.

Cornel Băntă is one of the few about whom we have nothing adverse to mention. Disliked by Maiorescu and Drăner because of the frankness with which he raises questions directly and unequivocally, he has risen through his professionalism, sense of organization and ability to make decisions.

These are approximately the people, cleaner or dirtier, who are managing the MER. The answers to many questions that the movement has been raising for more than two years depend upon this congress, as well as the role that it will play or not play on the Romanian political scene.

Treatment of Ethnic Germans Called Unjust

92B004024 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
23 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Open letter, dated 4 April, from representatives of the German Democratic Forum to Romanian officials and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—first paragraph is ADEVARUL introduction]

[Text] Everyone is familiar with Angerer's joke (.. because we don't have Germans.) More than once we have had an opportunity to note that we did "have" Germans, but did not know how to "use" them. One very typical and painfully conclusive example is offered by the attached open letter which, having come to the end of their tether, representatives of the German Democratic Forum entrusted to us for the unfortunate purpose of giving it noticeable publicity.

Sibiu, 4 April 1992

To His Excellency Ion Iliescu, president of Romania
His Excellency T. Stăvilas, prime minister
Mr. Maiorescu, minister of agriculture
Mr. Gheorghe, minister
Messrs. Dora Văziri Ursu and T. Văziri, secretaries of state

Recently we have been receiving a growing number of reports, claims, and complaints from Romanian citizens of German nationality regarding aspects of a gross social and national injustice and flagrant violations of the law especially in the implementation of Law No. 16/1991.

The people directly and immediately deprived of their legal rights and those who learned of such situations consistently pressed us to extend the contingent wishes to defend and restore legality, and to inform the public in the country and abroad about what has been occurring.

They asked us to appeal to all the firms that may intervene to ensure that this ethnic group, so harshly tried in the past, frequently only because of its nationality, does not endure fresh injustice and hardships precisely at this time, when Romania has also won its freedom and is aspiring to join the European common house and when in official documents it is asserting the stability of the ethnic Germans in Romania.

Any delay in resolving the following problems will shatter our faith in the benevolent declarations made by Romanian officials regarding the ethnic Germans and the wish and ability to achieve a law-governed state in Romania, and may lead to serious conflicts unwelcome to us.

1. a) More than one year after the passing of Law No. 16/1991 and only to 30 months since the issue of "certificates," less than 50 percent of the land has been distributed in a very large number of communes in Transylvania, and much less than that to ethnic Germans (for example, in the Braşov suburb of Bartholomew some of the 77 hectares has been distributed, 200 hectares out of 460 have not been distributed in the Halchua commune, Braşov County, 150 hectares out of 150 remained undistributed in Moşna, Sibiu County). For this reason, in 1991 people were unable to use in any way their ownership rights over the land allocated by law and confirmed by a certificate; thus, they were unable to carry out the fall sowing, which means that there will be no grain to harvest for bread; they will not be able to sow the spring crops (spring wheat, double barley) and should there be further delays in distributing the land, they risk losing any means of cultivating anything in 1992.

After frequent endeavors at city halls, commune members and mayors have been telling them: "The Saxons come later." "Let's see if there is any land left" (for example in Moşna, Ighiu Nou, Rău, all in Sibiu County, etc.) while their customers received the land to which they were entitled, usually when they wanted it so that what is left for "later" is grapes, hillside, and the plots farthest away from the commune (for example Dacia and Tărnăvechi, Braşov County).

b) In some localities, at the insistence of the inhabitants, in the fall of 1991 the communal councils distributed approximately 50 percent of the land so that the fall sowing could be done, while the remaining plots were to be allocated by the beginning of spring 1992. The owners carried out agricultural work on the plots distributed (fall plowing, sowing, fertilizer treatment), but now, at the beginning of spring, the newly elected mayors, uncontented the fall distributions, have replaced members of the communal commissions, and have allocated the same plots of land to others, so that now there are new owners for the same land.

Humiliated, threatened, but trusting in the force of the law rather than of the fact, ethnic Germans are searching with pain, worry, and sometimes disappointment and resignation, how stakes and other land marks are appearing in the wheat they sowed and the beds they plowed, how others are sowing the fields they prepared, and they wonder who will harvest what they sowed (for example in Moşna, Nemsă, Ighiu Nou, Sibiu County; Harman, Braşov County) and so forth.

c) We view as absolutely unacceptable the attempt to allocate land to ethnic Germans on the borders of

localities other than those of their residence, inhabited by Romanians or Hungarians, on the grounds that no land was left in their localities of residence (as in the Hărtibău commune, Braşov County). Note that in their centuries-long history the Transylvanian Saxons never deprived any other nationality of its land.

d) We believe that summoning only the ethnic Germans to town halls to bring additional proof of ownership—and that not in the spring of 1991, but in the spring of 1992, after the stage of verifications and reports was over, after the terms of appeal had expired and been resolved, after documents had been validated by the county commissions and ownership certificates had been issued—in an illegal, abusive act of intimidation of the ethnic Germans (example: Sînpetru Braşov).

e) The refusal to allocate land on grounds that "they or their parents belonged to the ethnic German group" (example: Rîşca Montană, Abud, Alba County), in towns in which, although they requested land, they received certificates and are denied possession and sent to IAS [state agricultural enterprises] to buy shares, the illegal allocation of only 0.5 hectares per family, the fact that the suit filed with the Diva Court continues to be postponed while the land distribution is nearing its end (Aurel Vlaicu commune, Hunedoara County), constitute additional irregularities in the implementation of Law No. 18/1991.

f) At the same time, we protest the refusal of some city halls to award possession or IAS managements to persons who have certificates—which means that their ownership right was recognized—on grounds that they are about to emigrate or have emigrated and left power of attorney to children, relatives, or friends and will dispose of the property as soon as possession has been taken, within the legal period of time (communes Sînpetru and Harman, Braşov County; Moşna, Sibiu County).

We protest the cuts in the plots of land due to the churches in accordance with Article 21 of Law No. 18/1991 (Buc, Alba County, Sînpetru, Braşov County), or the refusal to award possession, although certificates were issued and shares were requested from the IAS, which in their turn also refused them (Gheorghe commune).

II. In very many situations, (certified) land owners did not receive any of the crops harvested in 1991 on their land. For example from 426 hectares in the Harman commune, Braşov County, 208 hectares in Sînpetru, Braşov, 150 hectares in Moşna, Sibiu, 408 hectares in Nouă Săseni/Sibiu, and 108 hectares in Nemea, Sibiu.

III. In most situations, the 40-percent credit awarded for the land used by cooperatives was not distributed. Examples: Harman, Sînpetru, etc., Braşov County; Arel, Bierban, Moşna, etc., Sibiu County, and in other counties.

IV. The cases listed above do not exhaust the range of negative aspects in the implementation of Law No.

18/1991 to the detriment of ethnic Germans, nor the localities in which they are occurring, but they may be seen as significant examples designed to persuade you that measures have to be taken to ensure that the laws that are passed are also implemented. The fact of belonging to a minority must certainly not affect the obligation to equally apply the law to all the country's citizens.

We request your intervention to redress the mistakes made wittingly or unwittingly and to prevent a repetition of such mistakes.

First, however, we request that this group of citizens of the country also receive the land to which they are entitled, of an equal quality to that of the other citizens in their communes.

We demand that measures be taken to eliminate the tendencies to delay and intimidate and insults and labeling such as "Hitlerians," "nazi," etc. to which people are subjected when they press the local bodies to respect their rights.

We believe that all the state bodies, at all levels, are obligated to intervene when they find law violations: for us this is a basic condition for continuing our efforts to engage as loyal citizens in the country in which we were born and for turning to good account for the country the many opportunities offered precisely by our nationality.

[signed] Professor Ingrid Brandisch, parliament deputy
Hugo Schneider, economic department head

...

Ed. note: One copy of this letter was sent by the signatories to Mr. Gernsacher. We want to congratulate the obtuse or dishonest mayors at the localities listed or not listed in the memorandum for their wonderful contribution to supporting the foreign policy of the Romanian state and for confirming Romania in the world as a land of abuse, robbery, and injustice. We also want to congratulate the honorable prefects of the counties in question and all the gentlemen and ladies who, having the authority to deal with such situations, did not even in passing wonder what it would have been like to have suffered, during the period of establishment of bolshevism in Romania, even one fraction of what the ethnic Germans suffered for the simple fact of being "Germans."

Stolijan's Report on State of Economy Discussed

UJ.B.0100948 Bucharest 4/1 in Romanian 1 May 92 p. 1

[Unattributed report: "Half a Year of Stolijan"]

[Text:] The latest Stolijan report featured a synthesis of the achievements of the team installed after the September raid of the miners, the measures viewed as indispensable to consolidate the national economy the manner in which they can be implemented while at the same time protecting the public's incomes, and the

decisions regarding the 24 percent cut in subsidies for certain products and services.

The National government had until the political step: (1) organize free and honest local, parliamentary and presidential elections.

- The local elections were viewed as positive and as marking the beginning of a real reform of the economy and structure of local government.

- There is no real doubt that the parliamentary and presidential elections should not be held by the end of June 1992.

- The presence of national obscurity was viewed as necessary in conditions that their activity be governed by precise rules.

- The primary economic objective pursued by the present government is to regard the continuation of the economic and social reforms, the only means by which conditions can be ensured for efficient allocation of the resources of the country.

- Noting that the economic system analysis cannot allow to implement (1) was the case of the over-rough privatization method, the government sought to correct as much as possible the operation of certain measures and mechanisms of the market economy.

- Economic and social stability is essential and efforts will be made to maintain them by resolving critical issues and serious conflictual situations.

- End of 1992, government will take the decision of economic enterprises with state capital (only 11 were sold).

- Some 14 economic enterprises with state capital are being prepared for privatization with the assistance of special firms, by 1992. A prospectus will be issued in May regarding the sale of stock in 10 economic enterprises.

- As of the second half of May, sweeping certificate will be distributed to about 1.5 million people through a bank distribution system.

- Of a total of 2,061,000 state-owned housing units built with state funds, 841,000 (40 percent) have already been sold and 144,000 are in the process of being resolved.

- Work continues on the draft bill regarding a legitimization of the situation of the 25,000 housing units which caused the state housing crisis by means of nationalization, collectivization, etc.

- The consolidation of the rates of exchange of the lei (of 1 November 1991) and the spread of the effects of that consolidation throughout the economy served to directly correct the national price system in international prices.

- Eighty-three percent of the consumer goods production and services and 89 percent of the margin of intermediary products for investments and export are being sold at balanced prices between demand and supply.

- However, imbalances continue to be generated by the fact that the prices failed to balance between the demand and supply for 17 percent of the consumer goods and services and for coal and other minerals.

- While a free distribution of products was maintained in the domestic market, the foreign trade continued to be liberalized by reducing the number of products subject to contingencies or temporarily banned for export.

- As of 1 January 1992, a new customs tariff was introduced, adapted to the new situation.

- The Export-Import Bank will encourage exports, especially of equipment, installations and complex processing, by granting low-interest loans and guaranteeing export loans.

- On the basis of discussions between the government and trade unions, collective labor contracts were negotiated by sectors and contracts at the level of businesses, management and business contracts are now being finalized.

- As of January 1992, individual salary ceilings were lifted and limits were established in the growth of the overall wage fund, with a view to preventing an inflationary spiral.

- The economic emergency laws established introduced individual salaries by raising the productivity and saving off superfluous personnel.

- The period of payment of unemployment relief was extended from six to nine months; simultaneously, a system of social assistance was introduced for those who no longer qualify for unemployment payments.

- Three new banks were opened within six months: the Banquet Credit Bank and the Romanian Bank, and the Export-Import Bank was put into operation with an initial capital of 20 billion lei.

- The Commercial Bank formed by the split of the National Bank have begun gathering capital by issuing stock or through state contribution.

- It is believed that the stock exchange, the establishment of private property and of the state property fund, the activation of stock issues by commercial companies and the issue of new financial instruments for financing the budget deficit will provide an incentive for the capital market.

- A value-added tax will be introduced in 1993; the draft bill for it has already been adopted by the government and is now to be submitted to Parliament.

- The draft bill on local income and other taxes, which will give increased authority to local and county councils, is already in Parliament.
- The government, in consultation with the National Bank, has adopted the necessary measures to stabilize (partially) the money stock and strengthen the financial discipline of autonomous managements and businesses (by granting unpaid bills, establishing procedures for declaring companies as defaulting, etc.).
- After six months of consecutive drops in the industrial production, following the measures adopted on 13 November 1981 and in January and February 1982, the industrial output decline was stopped. Only 43 percent of the minimum power outputs were carried out in March, and only 38 percent by April; consequently, the industrial production has begun falling again, although orders are at hand.
- In the first quarter of 1982 exports were 24.2 percent larger than in the same period of 1981.
- On 13 April this year the number of unemployed and other jobless persons was 550,000 (4.8 percent of the country's active population), compared to 260,000 and 2.3 percent on 31 September 1981.

For the sake of comparison, the unemployment rate in Poland is 17 percent, and in Czechoslovakia 10 percent.

- In the past six months, 237 industrial production facilities were closed down in an orderly manner: 30 mines, 37 machine-building concerns, 41 chemical and petrochemical installations, and 46 units of the textile and leather industries.
- In March the price index was 205.8 percent compared to September 1981 and 417.3 percent compared to October 1980.
- The average nominal net wage index in March 1982 was 104.8 percent compared to September 1981 and 447.8 percent compared to October 1980.
- The ratio between the wage index and price index was 0.87 (in reference to September 1981) and 1.08 (in reference to October 1980).
- In 1981 the annual inflation rate was 123 percent and the average monthly inflation rate was 10.3 percent; in the first quarter of 1982 the average monthly inflation rate was 13.9 percent.
- In 1981 the budget deficit was \$1.3 billion, and the deficit projected for 1982 is about \$1.5 billion (\$1.4 billion in imports and 1.9 billion in exports).
- The essential reasons for the continued high inflation were increased basic wages with no accord between the labor force and labor productivity developments and delays of about two months in distributing the second installment of the loan contracted in 1981 with

the Group of 24, i.e. \$250 million, the latter having been of a humanitarian nature.

- In view of the shortage of foreign currency for debt commitments, the Romanian economy came to depend dangerously on foreign sources of financing the budget deficit (payments 38 percent of the exports envisaged for 1982 and 28 percent of the exports).
- Great stress is the increased and falling nature of foreign financing.
- Romania must as a first important objective to gradually eliminate the foreign-currency deficit, which means stopping the formation of foreign debt for the debt commitments of the economy and the public.
- There is only one alternative to the above objective: Within a few years we will have not only an economy based on outdated technologies, but also foreign debt.
- In accordance with the international financial rules, a country requesting foreign loans to finance a foreign currency deficit caused by debt economy and over-consumption must as a rule prove to its creditors that it has government programs aimed at eliminating the disequilibrium.
- Absence of government action at this time is dangerous, since it threatens any chance to ensure economic stability and to mend the national economy.
- In implementing the new interest rate policy, the Romanian National Bank (BNB) and the commercial banks will take the following steps: Raise the refinancing interest rates prescribed by the BNB from 26.25 percent to 30-40 percent or more. That 10 percent of the price increase index in March-April this year will make that necessary apply different interest rates for loans given by the commercial banks, so that they should be lower for old loans (granted to finance investments with a long production cycle, machinery, etc., according to individual case and in keeping with the amounts of the loans in question, determined by the cost of their credit resources).
- Special attention will be given, among other things, to diversifying the nature of export and import licenses, with the exception of licenses for faster operations, products subject to contingencies, etc.
- One of the hardest realities having a decisive impact on the people's living standard is that as the economy is becoming liberalized, individual products necessarily become subject to black marketing.
- The prices of products and services used by the entire population (electricity power, bread, milk, sugar, oil, etc.) will be increased by 25 percent of the existing subsidy; the protection measures will take effect for all categories of income (adults, pensioners, unemployment relief, state allocations for children, etc.); measures will be proposed by covering 100 percent of

the effects of the price increases, in keeping with the share of the family consumption taken up by each member.

—For products and services utilized by only certain categories of the population, payments for the tariff difference on weekly or monthly basis on standardized public transportation for commuters will be left to the discretion of the economic businesses, which may cover a part of their revenues (payments for the tariff difference for student weekly or monthly tickets on interurban transportation will be borne from the budget, the price of school notebooks for students at all levels will be established without reduction, but the price difference will be paid by the Ministry of Education and Science; school notebooks will be further distributed free of cost; rents will remain unchanged only 75 percent of the existing collection will be continued for rent cars and most products used in social protection programs; the prices of the other most products and meals will be changed following the elimination of subsidies for meat on the hoof.

Bank Loans Less Disruptive Under Control

(Bucharest, Romania, A/P in Romanian: 1 May, 1980, p. 1.)

I supervised meetings with National Bank Committee Major Leaders on 23 April; their one given "On Problems in Romanian Will Be Controlled Into Third Century".

(Note: A/P) On the measures concerning and the modification of the foreign currency regime during an explicit recognition of the fact that what was done in November was not implemented and that the fixing (as word given in English) was a blunder.

(Romania) The system that has been implemented in our country since November works very well, and has in countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The trouble with the November system was that, on the one hand, we opened on the basis of money with a low level of confidence, and on the other that in February we were compelled to practically break off the system. If it had continued we would have had to release the exchange rate and have interest rates, I ask you, was February the right time to let interest rates rise to 100 percent and to lose control of the exchange rate? Moreover, we did not know how was going to happen with foreign financing, we still did not have the agreements with the IMF and the World Bank. But even minutes with the system we used as of November experienced periods of control of about one to eight months and blackouts. The essential change we now recommend—out of psychological rather than purely economic considerations—is to restore business the right to keep foreign currency in Romanian banks.

In my opinion as an economist, if the two basic forms of domestic and foreign equilibrium—the exchange rate and interest rates—work well and if we balance them off, meaning that we can accept the social cost and the past

continuing from the necessities of their own system, then the foreign currency system does not matter to our country. Foreign currency payments are extraordinarily facilitated, which will permit some business transactions are doing something in their power to keep foreign currency. And when they cannot keep it in the country, the foreign currency goes abroad. That is why we agree to the commitment that we need to change the foreign currency regulations. All the businesses will be able to keep foreign currency, but the regulations will be very strict. In Romania payments will be made only in US, we will not allow the Romanian economy to once again be run in dollars, and payments will have to bring home within a given period of time all payments received abroad, which they can keep a number of Romanian regardless of whether the money is Romanian or foreign. In this manner we can prevent financial blackouts such as we experienced last year, when the businesses were keeping their foreign currency and choosing not to pay their bills. Nationally, 50 percent of the foreign currency payments received will be held in the exchange rate of the din, and the interest will be used to pay for power, water, and salaries. This is an operation typical of a market economy. This is not a matter of delivery—except it is taking over. The system will be the state's authority in the country. This operation will be presented in detail as a foreign currency regulation that will be issued next week.

(A/P) What can we do for the Romanian economy so no longer depend on foreign financing?

(Romania) We need to help ourselves. A country has no right that not means of maintaining in lack of equilibrium. The first is financing, whether from domestic sources—for which I would recommend, but our transactions are on the basis of inflation, or are domestic financing means inflation—or foreign financing, and how are it what conditions we are getting that.

The second stage is to adjust, adjust the regulations instead of postponing them. The answer is, yes, to order is not depend on foreign financing, we need to increase our adjustment efforts, which currency are parallel, but necessary. In our case, large high interest rates, which contribute to the recovery of the national currency. The essential currency is itself a contributor that, if it is sold under market price, under the market price, it means that we are indirectly subsidizing the price mechanism and we cannot subsidize a country by inflation.

(A/P) How much will the din be devalued?

(Romania) Of course, I cannot tell that. Now let I talk of the calculations made (will be) to go and to others. What I can tell you is that we will keep the devaluation of the din under control. It will not go off on a spiral, there will be no 100-percent inflationary devaluations like in November. We will move in accordance with the market conditions, as closely as possible to how other countries are proceeding at a low percentage, sometimes faster and sometimes more slowly. What is important is that

and the entire stock of its deposits in the banks for commercial and foreign currency has not been touched, we will not allow the exchange rate to move beyond the margins assumed by both the banks and businesses.

According to all our calculations, in the coming three or four weeks we can attract, i.e., pass the entire stock currently in the banks through the commercial channel almost all, because some of the stock is speculative which will deflate as soon as the interest rate will rise. Many people counted on such a move. They took loans at 20-35 percent interest and waited for the dollar to move from 200 to 300 lei, and made money in that way. These people will disappear of their own accord, we will not even have to chase them off.

[A.J.] How far will the new rate of the lei be supported?

[Bucuresti] The answer was to have foreign currency reserves. However currency reserves and international reserves of currency reserves in international financing, financing by previous accumulation of foreign financing. We are not well off in that area, and therefore the exchange rate will be supported rather by means of monetary, currency, and commercial policies, such as making the lei more expensive, raising interest rates, and discouraging commercial exports by introducing export surcharges.

[A.J.] What is the current stockpile situation?

[Bucuresti] We have material regarding stockpiles that we will present to Parliament. But we do have some significant figures. One of them has very serious implications: 23.4 percent of Romania's GNP, almost one-quarter of what is produced in this country, is stored in stock by the end of 1981. On the one hand, that shows that instead of going to consumption, all the accumulation will taking place or made in the Romanian economy remained blocked in material stockpiles. On the other hand, this explains the fall in consumption. Stockpiles cannot be used either for production or for final consumption. After an initial evaluation, stockpiles are distributed equally one-third to unfinished production, one-third to raw and other materials, and one-third to finished production for which another couple of reference marks exist in order to sell it, and the unusable production. As in conclusion I can tell you that this figure of 23.4 percent was also featured by the fact that last year it was financed at a very low interest rate.

[A.J.] What are the serious settlement methods that distinguish between those who pay their debts and those who do not, and those who fulfill their contracts with others?

[Bucuresti] The first condition is that anyone who is not paying his debts should go on normal trial. In a civilized country, someone who failed to pay \$50 for one day, goes to jail. Here billions of dollars are not paid and nothing happens to anyone. What chances can we have if we do

not observe these moral engagements for who civilized countries? Anyone who does not pay his debts must be punished. Last year we had more than 1,000 billion in interest payments, but in the end we justified all the defaults in the end. Each one started to cheat last year because of the other. This vicious circle must be broken.

[A.J.] What the plan of the strategic export reduction be reached by the respective nations?

[Bucuresti] Not necessarily. Dependence for the reduction will go if we manage to achieve a satisfactory plan at a 20 percent annual rate by December with a great example of 1.5 billion over or—over if this figure is significant—as a significant rate for a country getting out of a 2.5 to 3.5 percent annual rate reduction. A satisfactory return will not be enough to push the dollar to 1,000 lei. They used to have such a return, they used to say one new lei will equal 1,000 old lei, but they gave up because it was throwing up their calculations. Changing methods is rather a formal operation. That will not add strength to the national currency. If we were to make such comparisons, we would have to admit that the lei is weaker than the dollar because \$1 is worth over 200 lei. The strength of a currency comes from its domestic support. A functioning monetary system, however, is greatly weakening and a high rate of inflation is destroying social conditions. What is done tend to create a hyperinflation. We are not there yet, and we strongly hope not to get there.

In the changing the banknotes, we have begun the process and by the end of the year we will be ready to change all the banknotes and to pull out the worn ones. The process will begin already of 1982. As an example I want tell you that the banknotes alone make up one-third of paper. Now the main problem is that we do not know how and where to destroy them. In the normal procedure it would take up 17 years.

[A.J.] Will present credits become operational?

[Bucuresti] Under the requirements of the EXIMBANK and the methods established to guarantee loans, we have already managed in this year's balance of payments approximately \$500 million for project investments. So there are attempts to direct our foreign financing toward investments, not our own toward direct consumption. Look now three obstacles presented in front following that direction. The absence of currency reserves, the creation of a series of guarantees that each time, and a shortage of credit projects. An application or a couple of discussions are not enough for a foreign credit to consider an investment project. You need thoroughly researched projects, and we did not have many of those. The plan must persuade that we know how to work and that we have made all the calculations.

[A.J.] Is there any chance of securing the necessary foreign currency to buy agricultural treatment substances and fertilizers in time?

(Bucharest) As of this very afternoon (23 April 1990)—and hence the currency market will be unflooded. Which does not necessarily mean that the exchange rate will go its own merry way, so one needs to pause. In view of the

urgent need for agricultural exports, the foreign currency accounts were unflooded earlier with the approval of the government. The others, however, cannot be given priority, in spite of the heavy pressures applied.

Alleged Greek Program Against Macedonians

AGENCIJA Služba Republike Srbije za Međunarodne
odnose 17 May 82 pp. 1-2

[Article by Dragoljub Arsovic, special for NSO & MEKJ-
OKPNDK, "Secret Document for a Program Against
Macedonians"—(first paragraph of NSO & MEKJ-
OKPNDK introduction)]

[Text] is a letter to Greek President Karamanlis, the
Society of Threatened Peoples, exposing the Greek plan
for the destruction of Macedonians in Greece, insists
that the truth about Macedonia be told and that the
genocidal actions of the Greek secret police be stopped.

Dusseldorf, 14 May

The familiar Society of Threatened Peoples in the
World, with headquarters in Göttingen, which is also
known for publishing the periodical *POGROM*, which
on several occasions has come up with extensive infor-
mation on the situation of Macedonians in Greece and
on the Greek policy of genocide, created, on the eve of
the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the
European Community in Brussels, in its concern for the
protection of small nations, that steps be taken to reveal
the truth about Macedonia in Greece and the geno-
cidal actions taken by the Greek secret police toward
Macedonians in Greece. The letter was addressed to
Constantine Karamanlis, president of the Republic of
Greece, in Athens.

Among other things, the letter stresses the following:
"There are between 150,000 and 300,000 Macedonians
living in Greece, in our estimate. It is not a question of a
small linguistic group whose basic minority rights are
denied. The reason for such denials is exclusively the
intolerance shown by your government toward minori-
ties, especially by the leading New Democracy and
PASOK parties. Such an intolerant nationalistic
campaign waged against the neighboring Republic of
Macedonia should be ended and a ban imposed on
constant spying on and surveillance of the Macedonian
minority in northern Greece by Greek state security. A
secret document, which reached us recently, reveals that
the alleged 'threat from Skopje' is a means for the
destruction of the Macedonian minority in that area of
Greece."

Some of the methods aimed at the destruction of the
Macedonian minority are the following: Only Greek
citizens whose mother tongue is Greek have the right to
be employed in the northern part of Greece, whereas
Macedonians can work only in the southern Greek areas.
Most rigorous steps are taken to prohibit the use of the
Macedonian language and customs by party and youth
organizations in the villages of August Macedonia,
whereas Greek citizens are allowed to marry Mace-
donian women and thus reduce the number of Mace-
donians. The women are forced to deny their Macedoni-
anism. According to our information, this document
indicates a violation of fundamental and basic human

rights of Macedonians since the 1945 civil war. Since
then, the use of the Macedonian language has been
forbidden with the help of a variety of punishments,
fines, and imprisonment, not only in establishments
and camps but also in the very homes of the Mace-
donians. Anyone who left Greece during the civil war is
forbidden to return to his native place in Greece. Those
who have returned as Macedonians have had all their
possessions confiscated along with whatever they had
carried abroad. We also know that, in the past two years,
newly founded Macedonian societies have been kept
under constant control by the Greek secret services, for
which reason they have been unable to publish their
works, and the recognition of such societies has been
forbidden to the Greeks.

The letter to Karamanlis was signed by Timoteo Zilich,
president of the Society of Threatened Peoples, in the
light of the secret document, which accompanies the
letter, dated 18 February 1980, entitled "Memorandum
Against Macedonia," which shows that the Greek secret
service has undertaken specific actions to eliminate
everything Macedonian in northern Greece.

*The efforts of the people of Skopje to gain Macedonian
independence must be blocked by all possible means. The
first way is to prohibit the use of the Macedonian
language and for Macedonians to move to other parts of
Greece and be replaced by Greeks, thus eliminating the
Macedonian question.*

*To prohibit the return of Macedonians who had escaped
and lived elsewhere, so that not a single Macedonian will
remain in the northern part of Greece, and to block any
type of cultural and linguistic propaganda coming from
Skopje to that part of Greece.*

*To set up special organizations under the supervision of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and thus block the spread
of Macedonism in northern Greece.*

To employ individuals who do not speak Macedonian.

*To encourage those who are employed with poor housing
conditions, and other state benefits.*

*To promote Greek cultural activities and expand them, to
publish books and pamphlets to promote the concept that
abroad, August Macedonia will be considered Greek, thus
deleting the word "Macedonia."*

*To cause various difficulties for students from Greece
studying in Skopje to prevent them from pursuing their
studies (debtors denied and so forth).*

*To encourage young people everywhere to promote the
Greek idea and, if necessary, to persuade the people, with
the help of money, as well, that neither the Macedonian
language nor Macedonians exist.*

*To immediately move to the southern part of Greece all
individuals in Loma who are employed and who speak
Macedonian.*

To give service benefits and promotions to soldiers who marry Macedonian women and make them adopt Greek customs.

To industrialize the land with a view to full employment for the Greeks and the development of high standards, thus blocking the spread of propaganda coming from Skopje and neutralizing the Macedonians.

The document further stresses that all Macedonians must be kept under surveillance and subject to spying for the purpose of the definitive elimination of the Macedonians and the creation of pure Greek settlements, as

well as imposing all kinds of prohibitions on Macedonian societies, organizations, and slogans demanding independence, autonomy, or minority rights.

These regulations were signed by Lieutenant General Dimitris Kariliotis. It is further known that the task of the Aristotle Club in Düsseldorf is to mount Greek anti-Macedonian campaigns and that it is financially assisted by the Greek secret police. Furthermore, the Greek Consulate in Düsseldorf and Greek consulates elsewhere in Germany maintain a large network of Greek spies who pay attention to anything that goes on, similar to the former Soviet KGB.

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